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A. (σσ. 245-287)

Chapter 7

A Time of Great Crisis (1914-1922)

1. Introduction

A time of great crisis followed after Greece emerged victorious from the Balkan Wars. Society experienced severe polarization as a result of increasingly diverging views of King Constantine I and the Prime Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos. This led to what is known as “*National Schism*”. Two centers of power were formed: the royal one of King Constantine I in Athens, officially recognized, and that of Provisional Government of National Defense led by Venizelos in Thessaloniki. The National Schism presented an opportunity to the English and the French to blatantly violate the national sovereignty. Those great accomplishments of the previous years were now in jeopardy (1).

That divergence in views largely had to do with whether Greece would enter WWI on the Anglo-French side (this was Venizelos’ stance) or remain neutral (King Constantine’s position). However, the causes of polarization in Greek society were deeper and had to do with integrating the population of the “*New Countries*” into the Greek nation. With the annexation of the rest of Epirus and Macedonia, new productive forces emerged, the result being a strengthening of Greek middle class.

This caused a reaction from the established order, what came to be known as “*Old Greece*”, and the representatives of the old means of production. It must be pointed out, that many people of the lower classes were on King Constantine’s side, as they felt they could not keep up with the rapid changes taking place.

Despite the assassination of Ion Dragoumis by members of Venizelos’ group and assassination attempts on Venizelos and Pavlos Kountouriotis by supporters of King Constantine I, all signs of the underlying tension, the National Schism seemed to atone as Greece realized victories during WW1 and Asia Minor Campaign. However, the National Schism will resurface after 1922 causing major upheaval in the country until 1935.

That period ends with the Catastrophe of Smyrna and the ending of Hellenic presence in Asia Minor, which dates back to the Mycenaean Era. That tragic event stops the realization of the *Great Idea* and the Greek nation is facing the urgent problem of how to assimilate the refugees. The appearance of refugees financially and socially reinforced the Greek state, but at the same time, tensions keep running high in Greek society: many of its members view both Venizelos and King Constantine I as responsible for the difficult situation in Greece.

The Greek Navy participates in and is affected by the situation during this period, as quite often deeply politicized officers take part in the unrest. At the same time, new regulations are into effect, weakening the Navy as far as its equipment is concerned, and making the acquisition of new ships impossible. These regulations, however, do not correspond with the geopolitical standards of the area. Nevertheless, the Greek Navy ably and bravely fought in the Greco-Turkish War, though its valuable contribution is often overlooked. Although the Ottoman Empire's Navy was well equipped, Kemal Ataturk's revolutionary army was not able to utilize that equipment. Thus, the Greek Navy inevitably had a subsidiary role during combat operations, because no regular adversary existed.

2. The weakening of the Navy

Following the Balkan Wars, the importance of a powerful fleet to defend the Greek interests became clear, as both Greece's entrance in the Balkan Alliance and the victory in the ensuing conflict was mostly attributed to the Navy. However, the government followed a policy that contributed to its weakening (2).

A significant reason behind this policy must have been the imposed expenditure cuts. Venizelos borrowed £25 million for the development of a doubled state, thus naval resources were placed second.

In 1911 the Ottoman Empire ordered an English *dreadnought* called *Resadie*, with a displacement of 23 million tons and a speed of 21 knots. Therefore, the Greek Government, with Nikolaos Stratos as Minister of Defense, ordered in 1912, a battleship from the German shipbuilding company *Vulkan*, along with a torpedo boat, like the battleship *Aegli*. The new torpedo boat would have a displacement of 13 million tons, eight 35cm calibre guns, six

15cm calibre guns and would cost £1.050.000. The famous *Salamis* was bound to become a real gear for the Greek Navy.

Another important defeat was that of *Rio de Janeiro*, a *dreadnought*, which would be built in England and was unexpectedly available, as the country for which was originally being built, Brazil, shifted its Defense planning. The Ottoman Empire bought the dreadnought and renamed it *Sultan Osman-i Evvel*. The fact that Greek Navy officers had suggested that the government purchase the powerful ship is remarkable (3).

Due to negligence of the Greek government, the Ottoman Empire, which was defeated in the Balkan Wars, regained its maritime superiority. The new vice-admiral, Pavlos Kountouriotis, could not stand watching the loss of his accomplishments, so he offered to command either the submarine *Xifias* or a small torpedo boat. His plan was to ambush and torpedo *Rio de Janeiro* as it was passing the Strait of Gibraltar, without any previous declaration of war. It would be suggested that Kountouriotis was acting on his own accord and, in case he survived the raid and returned to Greece, the government would disown, arrest, trial and incarcerate him just like a pirate. Venizelos, however, did not accept his offer (4).

The blockade on the Strait of Dardanelles was also discussed, with a potential occupation of the Gallipolis Peninsula, in order to stop the arrival of more battleships. However, none of these plans was implemented. During the outbreak of WWI, those battleships remained in British shipyards and were eventually confiscated by the British for their own needs.

Nevertheless, Greek public opinion was expressing deep concerns, because of the imminent strengthening of the Ottoman Fleet. Thus, Greek political leadership bought six new *doris-class* torpedo boats (125 tons, 24 Knots with three extremely old type torpedo tubes,). Furthermore, Venizelos himself proceeded to inform the anxious Greek community in Paris, that the Greek Navy would be able to fight the reinforcements of its Ottoman counterpart with the assistance of those six torpedo boats (5).

Later on, the Navy proceeded with unnecessary purchases, such as two American battleships, *USS Idaho* and *Mississippi* (built in 1907), later renamed *Kilkis* and *Limnos*. Their most crucial disadvantages were low speed and short height, whereas a big innovation

was their wide use of electrically powered machinery. It must be noted that Greece ended up paying £3.130.000 instead of £2,7 million for *Rio de Janeiro*. In addition to this, America bought cruiser *Elli I*, a battleship of 2100 tons, 20 knots with extremely old artillery, originally ordered by the Chinese Navy. *Elli I* was destined to be sunk by the Italians on the 15th of August 1940 in the Greek island of Tinos.

Meanwhile, the torpedo boat *Salamis* met with a really bad fate: towards the end of 1912, word got around that Greece needed to acquire a real *dreadnought*. Therefore, the building of *Salamis* was suspended until its new features could be completed. The building process continued until December of 1914 and then WWI broke out. The Greek government did not accept the ship, while financial disputes with the German shipbuilding companies were settled much later, in 1932 specifically, after the Greek State suffered a severe financial hardship, as Greece had to pay a further amount of £30.000 in addition to the £450.000 already paid.

Finally, under the intervention of the Allies in Greece's internal affairs, in September 1916 the French took over the Greek light-duty fleet, namely *Elli*, 14 destroyers, 5 torpedo-boats, 2 submarines and 8 vessels. The battleships *Kilkis* and *Limnos*, as well as the armored cruiser *Averof* had been decommissioned in the Naval Base: only one a third of their crew was still in place, while the clasps of their cannons, the torpedoes and their munitions were removed (6).

As the Greek Navy became outdated, the Ottoman one was reinforced with two additional ships. During the outbreak of WWI, two German battlecruisers, *Goeben* (*Magdeburg-class*) and *Breslau* (*Moltke-class*) that were arriving in Istanbul, traveled to the Eastern Mediterranean and were delivered to the Ottoman Navy in August 1914. They were renamed as *Yavuz Sultan Selim* and *Midili* respectively.

3. The contribution of the Navy during WWI (7)

a) National Schism and the occupation of the Greek Fleet by the Allied Forces

The difference in views between the Greek PM and the King with regard to Greece's entrance in WWI on the Anglo-French side, resulted in a prolonged crisis of governing the country. On the 8th of February 1915 (8), Venizelos resigned for the first time. In the

elections held in May 1915 Thessalonians vote for the first time and Venizelos prevailed, only to resign a little later. On September 23 of 1915, Bulgaria started mobilizing troops and showed a change in its strategy (11th of October 1915) with an offensive on Serbia.

Venizelos acted unconstitutionally (9) and, without having the King's authorization and the approval of the Parliament, he proceeded to invite British and French military forces in Thessaloniki and then exerted pressure on the Greek Government to renounce its neutralist policy. 125.000 French and 100.000 English soldiers gathered in the capital of Macedonia.

At the end of December, German aircrafts bombarded Allied military posts, while on the 2nd of June 1916, Germans and Bulgarians invaded the straits and Fort Roupel and later entered East Macedonia. The Greek population was treated harshly especially by the Bulgarians.

Sarail declared a state of siege in Thessaloniki and occupied the island of Thassos. On the 9th of June 1916, an Anglo-French conference held in London approved the naval blockade of Greece. A press release was even issued, demanding the resignation of the government, new elections, withdrawal of the military forces and the removal of senior military and government officials that were hostile to Entente (10). On the other side, Germans and Bulgarians occupied the port of Kavala and sent a Greek army of 8.000 men in total to German military camps.

On August 29, 1916, took place the Movement of National Defense supported by Sarail (11). Venizelos returned to his homeland, Crete, and on the 9th of October 1916, he announced the formation of a provisional government established in Thessaloniki. The Allies recognized de facto the Government of National Defense of Thessaloniki and further increased their pressure to the government of Athens. English and French officers took control of the railways, as well as the navy shipyards and strongholds in Athens.

On December 1st, the French admiral Dartige du Fournet landed 2.500 men to the Greek capital in order to control it. Street fights between the French soldiers and their so-called opponents erupted all around Zappeion, in the National Garden and at Philopappos Hill. The Anglo-French fleet opened fire and sixty-four shells blew up in the city (12).

Supporters of Venizelos were being harshly persecuted in the following period. On the 11th of June 1917, the French and the British delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Prime Minister, with which they demanded the King's resignation within 24 hours, as well as the abdication of the crown prince from the succession to the throne (13). King Constantine I resigned and went into exile in Switzerland. His youngest son, Alexander I, succeeded him to the throne (1893-1920) and on June 27th, Eleftherios Venizelos was once again Prime Minister of Greece.

As the Allies laid more pressure to the government of Athens, the French took over the Greek light-duty fleet, while the battleships, as mentioned already, remained decommissioned (14). After the King was dethroned, Venizelos returned to a unified Greece and the efforts to reconstruct the Navy under the leadership of the admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis were increased (15), just like during Balkan Wars. The ships and shipyard were returned to Greece, although in bad condition (16). The reconstruction of the armored cruiser *Georgios Averof* and of the so-called *Wild Beasts* (*Leon, Ierax, Aetos, Panthir*) became a key priority (17).

At the end of WWI Greece was among the victorious Allied Forces (18). In Moudros of Lemnos, the Allies and the defeated Ottoman Empire signed a treaty in October 17/30 1918 (Armistice of Mudros). The cruiser *Georgios Averof* sailed in Bosphorus with the Allies. On the 14th of November 1918 the cruiser moored in front of Dolmabahçe Palace causing great enthusiasm among Greek citizens (19). The Greek Navy was present at the most important moment of the Nation; the Greeks were entering in triumph the former capital of Byzantium after centuries.

b) The contribution of the Navy in Southern Russia (20)

In the early 20th Century, Czarist Russia is dealing with severe cracklings (21) that lead to the fall of Czar's monarchy and the rise of socialism. The country's stagnation concerning its industrial development in combination with low living standards of its population created an explosive mixture that led to the October Revolution of 1917. The Czar quickly became the target of frustrated people, asking for political freedoms. Meanwhile, Czarist Russia's involvement in WWI heightened the terrible living condition of its people.

The country's internal disturbances were competing with the external defeats (22) and, as a consequence, the Czar Nicholas II was forced in a turbulent situation to promise the formation of an elected Duma: the October Manifesto (Oct. 17/30 1905) (23). However, his consequent interventions intensified the political unrest. As a result, the period between 1905 and 1917, during which the February and October Revolutions manifested, became known as the *pseudo-constitutional absolutism phase*. Tensions remained high throughout the country with murders and terrorist attacks taking place.

At the same time, war conditions were dramatic (24). Russia had lost plenty of its territory, including significant market and industrial centers, and that had the expected impact on the country's economy. Moreover, the casualties of the Russian Army were numerous and the soldiers were entering the battle unarmed, being instructed to take the weapons of their dead colleagues.

On the 23th of February/8th of March 1917, a massive demonstration took place in Saint Petersburg, which marked the end of the czarist regime, as the city's garrison was also participating. The Duma adopted an imperial decree, the "Decree on Peace". This decree dissolved the Duma and replaced it with a government of twenty persons. The only socialist among them was the Ministry of Justice, Alexander Kerensky.

The new government, however, had to face some huge problems: The country's production domain and economy were stagnant, due to endless demonstrations, while the army was literally being disbanded by mass desertion. The general Lavr Kornilov, who Kerensky had put in charge of the whole west front with the mission to repress desertion, was imprisoned by Kerensky himself. The latter one was suspecting that Kornilov was conducting a movement and that resulted in a desertion outbreak.

During the night of October 24 to 25 1917, Bolsheviks made their move and, until the next evening, all significant regions of the Russian capital were under their control. Kerensky had returned to the front for reinforcements, but his action was fruitless. Meanwhile, Kornilov and his fellow inmates escaped and headed towards the Don Cossacks. That was the beginning of the Russian civil war.

The new situation led to secessions and centrifugal tendencies. In April 1917, the Russian Communist Party, the Bolsheviks, called a declaration at the 7th Congress of the party, while Stalin, who was the Commissar of Nationalities at the time, announced a manifesto about self-determination of all peoples. Those actions encouraged people of different ethnicities living in Russian regions to start declaring their independence. Those countries were initially Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Later on, other ethnicities, like the Don Cossacks, Kurdish people, citizens of Astrakhan etc., declared their autonomy too and showed their strong opposition to the Soviet Regime. Finally, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were acknowledged as separate and autonomous states. In addition, the Communist Government called a truce with Germany by signing the Treaty of *Brest-Litovsk* (February 18/March 3 1918).

According to the Treaty, Russia lost 60 million people and 2 million square miles of land, which were given to the Central Powers. Russia was, also, forced to give Germany 6 billion gold marks. Finally, the communist propaganda was forbidden in the states of the Central Powers. A little later, on March 10, Bolsheviks relocated their capital to Moscow and in May the whole Russian royal family of was executed in Yekaterinburg.

The Russian White Army (26) gradually went under the command of the admiral Alexander Kolchak (27). In the summer of 1918 thirty different parties existed all around the former Russian Empire. Twenty nine of those parties were hostile to the Soviet Regime (28), while Russia's size had decreased and equaled the size of the medieval state of 1547 ruled by Ivan The Terrible (29).

The main reason behind the intervention of Western States in Russia was initially to inhibit Germany from taking the war material and naval units of the Russian Fleet. Moreover, the Western States wanted to prevent Germany from controlling the rich soils of South Russia, so as to weaken the Pan-Turkism threatening to connect Turkey with other Turkic-Tatar groups of Central Asia. Also, the Western States wanted to protect the Christian population against the Turks. The British, especially, were trying to protect their possessions in Middle East and their north-western passages against Turkish and German invasions. Those passages were successfully protected by the Russian Army, until the fall of the Russian Empire (30).

After the Central Powers were defeated, the real causes behind the intervention of the Allied Forces in Russia were revealed. The British wanted full control of the energy sources in Southern Russia and its neighbors in the South. The French wished to completely influence their Austro-Hungarian successors in the trading industry and financial and diplomatic sectors in Poland and Ukraine. The Japanese wished their expansion to Eastern Asia, whereas the Americans wanted to control the Pacific and confront Japan.

Greece participated in this military campaign providing two infantry divisions in Ukraine, eight torpedo-boats in Crimea and three battleships in the Black Sea. The real reasons behind Greece's participation are linked to the Asia Minor Campaign (31). Nevertheless, Greece's international involvement was demanded by France, which desired Greece's participation in the campaign (32). Eleftherios Venizelos wanted to promote the image of a modern and liberal Greece-the last outpost of civilized West in the East (33).

The Greek land forces fought in Ukraine and Crimea from January 7/20 of 1919 until April 15/28 of 1919, namely 99 days, while the naval units fought in the shores of those countries from November 12/25 of 1918 until March of 1920 (34), which is more than 307 days.

The ships that took part in the campaign are the following: cruisers *Kilkis* (40 days) and *Lemnos* (21 days), the armored cruiser *Georgios Averof* (6 days), destroyers *Aetos* (41 days), *Velos* (8 days), *Thyella* (4 days), *Ierax* (39 days), *Keravnos* (28 days), *Leon* (5 days), *Loghi* (13 days), and *Panther* (263 days). There was, also, a hospital ship, *Amphitrite*, and a passenger ship, *Kanaris* (35).

The expedition of the Greek Fleet can be summarized in the following three points (36):

- a) taking over the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea (37)
- b) supporting land forces
- c) protecting refugees and evacuating areas.

Panther was located in Crimea under the commands of vice admiral A. Kalthorp via the British commander of destroyer forces in Sevastopol, until the 22nd of December 1918. On January 4 of 1919, the British commander was abducted by the 2nd Fleet (*1ère Escadre*) of the French Navy (*1ère Armée Navale*), under the commands of rear admiral *Amet*, who had raised his banner on the battleship *Democratie* in Sevastopol. However, the British

undertook once again the local naval units, after the crewmen of the French battleships rebelled in April 1919 (38).

The Greek ships had taken on all kinds of expeditions, as besides the patrols and war duties, they were carrying staff, supplies, spare supplies, the post office and more. There was neither help from the French nor logistics. In addition, a lot of other problems had occurred, like shortage of supplies, health issues, even the officers' finances. The commander of *Panther* was often asking for assistance through reports to the commander of *Averof* (39). The worst part, however, was the expedition's lack of clarity and purpose (40).

It was decided, that the Greek ships *Ierax* and *Panther* would start the expedition. They would be part of the front that would cover the battleships all the way to Crimea. Suddenly the epidemic of Spanish flu (influenza) broke out on *Ierax*, and later, the ship suffered a severe accident, which rendered it unusable for several months (41).

Panther was facing severe problems too, as it lost both its stern torpedo tube and torpedo, due to rough seas (42). *Panther* departed alone in the morning of 12th/25th of November 1918 and sailed through Bosphorus with the allied battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The arrival of *Panther* in Sevastopol was gloriously welcomed by the Greek population of the city (43).

The day after *Panther* arrived in Sevastopol, a British destroyer delivered the Russian destroyer *Zvonki* (:loud), which was in a terrible condition, and *Panther's* crew cleaned and tested it. Later on, members of *Panther's* headquarters and crew transported the Russian vessel in Istanbul and delivered it to Andreas Triantaffyllidis, the lieutenant of *Aetos*. The officers and the rest of the crew returned to Sevastopol with a British *sloop* (44).

During its fourth patrol and after a letter written by the commander of the French battleship *Vergninud*, *Panther* was called up to take over and rescue the tugboats and barges at the Port of Horli. According to information of the White Army, the Bolsheviks were planning to take them over and use them to invade the northwestern coast of Crimea. They wanted to flank with the forces fighting in the Isthmus of Perekop.

After gathering information from the allied destroyers and the existing minefields of the White Army, the commander of *Panther*, Giannikostas, managed to plan and sketch a way out of those minefields. The open channel between the shallow waters of the minefield coast was of a safe width and, in certain points, less than 600 yards. It was raining, foggy and the sea was wavy, but *Panther* managed to pass the minefield channel and moored at the first channels of Horli.

When *Panther* arrived, the crew started immediately collecting the tugboats and barges. At the same time, a Russian wheeled vehicle called *Ignatiev* with twenty White Army soldiers arrived as well. The armament of the ship was 12 machine-guns in bad condition and a rapid-fire gun of 75mm with no bolt and some munitions.

As three crew men of *Ignatiev* were sitting at the village café, a gang of Bolsheviks came to arrest them. They arrested two out of the three and the third one warned the ships. In the fray that followed, the Bolsheviks left with three White Army soldiers as hostages.

The commander of *Panther* did not take into consideration the threats of the Bolsheviks' leader and sailed for miles, so as to welcome two hydroplanes that ditched next to his ship. He sent one of the hydroplanes to Perekop, in order to inform the others that the sea was safe. The other hydroplane was sent to the Bolsheviks' area, in order to distribute leaflets to the locals that were said to harbor the Bolshevik gang.

The overall results of Greece's participation in the Russian Civil war against the Bolsheviks were negative. As a consequence, the Greek population of the area was persecuted. Also, the Soviet policy held a negative disposition concerning matters of Greek interests, especially towards the upcoming Campaign in Asia Minor.

4. The Maritime Training until 1922.

As it has already been mentioned, the Ottoman Empire got the naval superiority once again, due to negligence of both Greek governments. That led to hasty decisions to acquire naval units in 1914, namely the battleships *Limnos*, *Kilkis*, and the cruiser *Elli*. The Fleet growth created a need for more officers (45). It was proposed that 26 members of the English mission, graduates of the Technical University, would be enlisted and after one year of

training on *Georgios Averof*, they would be named *ensigns*. This proposal, however, was not approved and the Academy had to cover the needs for more officers.

Consequently, the need to expand the Academy's facilities emerged, as it could support only 40 *ensigns*. Therefore, using the whole main building to accommodate the *ensigns* was decided, as well as constructing a new building that would serve as a school. In the middle of September 1913 and in order to accelerate the construction process, the Academy was moved to four mansions in Strofyli of Kifisia, Athens. The Pesmatzoglou mansion served as dormitories and a smaller mansion on Chelidonous Street served as teaching apparatus.

The apparatus was quickly built and it was located between the main building and the commander's residence. It included the offices of the commander, the deputy commander, the director of studies and the school monitors' office. It also included a large wardroom and ten teaching classrooms. The main building was internally modified; the first floor included the rest accommodation areas and the second one only chambers. In the beginning of March 1914, the Academy operated again in Piraeus and was able to cover the needs of 130 *ensigns*.

In September 1913, the Academy Administration had been assigned to the English captain of the British mission, *Sidney Mayrick*, who was considered an expert at educational matters. Mayrick tried to introduce the Academy to some innovative ideas, though they were mostly out of the Greek mindset. Mayrick made significant internal changes; he assigned the duties of the "class leader" to an *ensign*, without taking seniority into consideration.

Furthermore, the importance of physical education and sports became disproportionate for the *ensigns*. Mayrick would bring boxing gloves at the morning training and challenge the *ensigns* to compete with him. He was even teaching them a game called "fox hunting", in which he and an *ensign* would pretend to be the foxes that came out of the fields of Kifissia with their traces uncovered. The other *ensigns* had to follow their traces and find them. At the end of the game, Mayrick would offer them tea. Many times, however, the *ensigns* would spend their time in local cafes playing backgammon instead of participating in the game. Finally, the *ensigns* reacted against Mayrick and when the school year ended, he got transferred.

When the Academy started operating again in Piraeus, more ensigns were able to enlist. In 1914, 57 ensigns were enlisted. For the first time, they were enlisted with the following three ways: 27 ensigns joined the first class via entrance exams, 27 older ensigns with a certificate of a senior school class joined the second class via entrance exams, and three ensigns joined the second class via reclassification of the Army Academy second-graders.

In the following years, 18 and 28 more ensigns were enlisted as well (46). In 1914, the Academy acquired telephone communication and a summer uniform was established, similar to the current one (47). Moreover, educational voyages on torpedo-boats have been taking place and the class of 1913 sailed even to Newport News, Virginia to receive the battleship *Kilkis*.

The technological developments of the time had created the belief that an officer should be trained further. That mindset led in 1915 to the establishment of a new navy rank: the “midshipman ensign” (48). After their graduation, ensigns would be named “midshipmen ensigns” and would be trained for five more months in the “Artillery and Torpedoes School”. After that, they would be commissioned as *ensigns*. Nevertheless, that new institution was not successful, because in reality, it was just prolonged school training and was only implemented twice: in 1916 and in 1920. In 1921 began the implementation of lieutenant trainings in the “Artillery, Torpedoes and Military Signals School”, which operates to this day.

The continuous war hardships and the consequent financial distress had an effect on the Midshipmen Academy. In 1917, due to economic stringency, the dirks of the graduates were returned and the ensigns had the right not to wear gloves, as they were not distributed by the Academy. No educational voyages took place that summer. Half of the school year ensigns would stay in the Academy and for the rest, they would train on the battleships in Keratsini.

In 1918 (49) a new operation of the Midshipmen Academy was published. According to that operation, the minimum age limit of the applicants was 13 years of age, while there was no restriction on the number of enlistees. At that time, the institution of the “midshipman ensign” was introduced too and the courses were increased to 36, all taught by 22 professors and nine teachers. Citizen-teachers were mostly appointed those who taught in Universities or Technical Schools. Otherwise, they ought to have the qualifications of a Junior High

School teacher at least. During summer educational voyages, the first-class and second-class ensigns would embark on big ships, whereas third-class ensigns embarked on light vessels.

In 1920 the Academy certificate was equivalent to the certificates of higher educational institutions and its graduates could be absorbed in those institutions as associate teachers. (50) In 1922 a new regulation enters into force (51), according to which there is no minimum age limit for the enlistees. The first of the enlisted ensigns had the advantage of paying half of the tuition, while the children of Asia Minor refugees paid no tuition fees (52). Between the years 1919-1922, the battleships used for educational voyages were participating in war operations - from the intrusion of *Georgios Averof* in Istanbul to the Asia Minor Catastrophe (53).

After the arrival of the British forces under the commands of rear admiral *Lionel G. Tuffnell* (54), two things were decided: The Midshipmen Academy would operate ashore and the number of its students would be increased. That need became more urgent after the Balkan Wars, due to high demand for non-commissioned officers to reinforce the Fleet.

As far as the education of ensigns is concerned, the recruitment of Navy non-commissioned officers with a teacher's certificate was decided. Therefore, three "master teachers" were recruited, according to the Edict of the 20th of February 1914. That year the students of the Midshipmen Academy were divided in three classes, A, B and C, according to their age. The younger students were placed in A class, the older ones in B class and those who had reached the age of 17 were in C class. The ensigns would also graduate at the age of 17, regardless of their education level and competence.

The Training Regulations plan was also decided. The plan required a three-year compulsory attendance to courses and graduation with a grade that would certify the acquisition of necessary knowledge for their future service. Moreover, ensigns would be trained in the Academy for the first two years and in the third one on a ship. In May 1914, the most advanced Academy class boarded the battleship *Hydra*, which was moored on Xaveris Coast in Piraeus. The ensigns were attending both school and maritime courses on *Hydra*, as the ship was operating educational voyages for Reserve Officer School students (55).

In 1914, some specific issues concerning the Midshipmen Academy were settled (56). Midshipmen would voluntarily be recruited children of preferably naval families and above the age of 15-17, after submitting a written consent by their parents or by the authorized family council trustee. The recruitment period was decided by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and only those with the necessary physical qualifications were chosen. The total number of ensigns was decided by SECNAV. When the recruited ones reached the age of 18, they were named *seamen* and ought to serve the Navy for five years. They, also, ought to study in a specialization training school, depending on the Service's needs.

The ensigns, who had already served for two months and had been distinguished for their good conduct, their skills and their ability to impose their morals on their colleagues, were awarded with a special red ribbon. The ribbon was 1cm wide and 500 cm long and was sewed vertically on the left upper arm and towards the forearm. The special badge on the ribbon was called *Good Conduct Badge* and was awarded by the Main Gymnasium commander. The badge holder would get a salary bonus of 20 coins per week. The Midshipman, who would be considered unworthy of the award, would have to return the badge by decision of the commander of the Main Gymnasium. The awarded ensigns could not be more than two in each group of 15 members.

The ensigns, who had been awarded with the badge and had served the Navy for 10 years, were called *ensigns supervisors* and there was one in every group of 15 ensigns. Besides their *Good Conduct Badge*, they also carried a small crown, which was gold on their winter uniform and blue on their summer one. The ensign supervisor was chief of the 15 ensigns in his group. He was responsible for their discipline and good order in the unit and accountable for any mistakes. The supervisors would receive a salary bonus of 20 coins per week. The Midshipmen Academy Administrator was responsible for the discipline, training and good living conditions of the ensigns. It was his duty to supervise all of the ensigns since their arrival, as well as to regularly check their attire. He had to impart his love of sports and training to the ensigns and was responsible for the hygiene in the chambers and everything else concerning the ensigns.

In 1916, due to National Schism, arose some difficulties in the functioning of the Academy, which resulted in its shutdown. The ensigns who were being trained in the battleship *Hydra* were named *seamen* and took their positions on the ships, while the A class ensigns, who

were attending courses in the Academy, got discharged by the Navy. In 1918, by Royal Decree (57), the Midshipmen Academy started operating in one of the ships attached to the Main Gymnasium, which was administrated by the commander of the Main Gymnasium.

In case the Academy operated ashore, the ensigns would have to board a ship and go on a three-month educational voyage. According to the Decree mentioned above, ensigns were being immediately admitted into the Academy, which was administrated by the lieutenant commander who was also commander of the ship, when the Academy operated on board. The appropriate non-commissioned officers were being appointed as trainers in various specialties by the Main Gymnasium commander (58). Finally, one or more teachers were being appointed in the Academy to grammatically educate the ensigns.

The Academy curriculum included naval and military training courses, as well as grammatical education courses, such as reading, writing, service report writing, geography and history. The details of the *curriculum* had been enacted by the Hellenic Navy General Staff. At the end of every month, the Administrator of the Academy would give the commander of Main Gymnasium a brief report about the performance of the Academy facilities followed by his own comments and suggestions.

Each July and after the exams, the Main Gymnasium deputy commander would inspect the whole Academy and make a shortlist of each student's competence and then, he would combine the shortlist with the commander's report. Each January and in case the commander considered it necessary, he would make a general inspection in the Academy. If he once again considered it necessary, he would prepare a detailed inspection report with his comments and suggestions for the Hellenic General Navy Staff.

In 1919, the Academy started operating again in Poros, after the reconstruction and development of its facilities. During the reconstruction period, the ensigns were initially accommodated in the yacht *Amphitrite*, and later in destroyer *Miaoulis*. In 1918, 21 specialist schools were operating in the Main Gymnasium for the crew members, after they had received their introduction courses. The specialties were: riggers, artillerymen, steersmen, engineers, stokers, electromechanical engineers, torpedo engineers, firearm engineers, telegraphists, carpenters, divers-caulkers, scriveners, storekeepers, cooks, cornets, musicians, nurses, trainers, shooters and ensigns. The specialist schools of

steersmen, cooks, cornets, teachers and trainers were operating in Main Gymnasium and the schools of riggers and engineers were operating in the ships attached to the Main Gymnasium. The other schools were operating in the Torpedo School, in the Naval Artillery School, in the Naval Base, in the Naval Hospital and in the Wireless Telegraph Station of Athens. Finally, the musicians were attending courses on the ship or in the respective position in the navy band.

5. The Naval Base (60)

a) The occupation of the Fleet and Naval Base by the Anglo-French

Due to National Schism and the formation of two centers of power, the royal one in Athens and the venizelist one in Thessaloniki, Greece was in the center of interventions held by foreign powers and that resulted in an intolerable violation of Greece's national sovereignty.

Within those interventions, on November 3d 1916, the admiral of the Allied fleet, Dartige du Fournet, demanded that the Greek Government hand over all of its war material. The French admiral demanded, also, the handing over of the Naval Base light-duty fleet and the disarmament of battleships, *Georgios Averof*, *Kilkis* and *Limnos*. The Greek Government agreed to hand over the ships, but did not accept to arm them with French crew. Moreover, the demoralization of the crew and officers lead to desertion. The deserters boarded the French cargo ship *Marievan* (62) that was entering Keratsini and they were transported to Thessaloniki.

In the morning of November 19 1916, Allied tugboats, mostly French ones accompanied by torpedo boats, entered the Naval Base (63), and after that, the French proceeded with its occupation. French military contingents, under the commander Dartige du Fournet, took over the Directory, the general storage, the workshops, the reservoirs, the artillery directorate and the ammunition of *Leros* (64). In the workshops of the Naval Base served the B Class chief engineer, Katogas, who got transferred from the workshops and put in suspension (65), because he could not tolerate the administrative interference of the workshop commander, the French shipbuilder *Massenet*. The occupation of the fleet and Naval Base continued until the 14th of July 1917. At the time, King Constantine II had passed

the throne to his son, Alexander, and Venizelos had once again taken the reins of the reunified Greek State.

b) The Naval Base contribution to WWI (66) and Asia Minor Campaign (67)

There is not much information available about the contribution of the Greek Naval Base to the allied forces during WWI. That is mainly due to the overwhelming events that took place and put the activities of the Naval Base (68) in second place of historical research, despite their significance. Moreover, any relevant historical research was focused more on the National Schism and Asia Minor Campaign rather on the activities of the Naval Base.

On the contrary, the contribution of Salamis Naval Base during the Asia Minor Campaign was decisive and multi-faceted and it was historically accounted too. The Naval Base contributed greatly to the manning and technically supporting the forward operating naval bases, including the Istanbul Naval Base. It, also, contributed to the construction of gun emplacements and other works taking place at the front. Furthermore, the Naval Base helped with the supplying of military equipment on cargo ships. It is worth mentioning the equipment of the fishing vessels *Li-3* and *Li-4* in March 1921: a 7.5 cm Croupe rapid-fire gun and a 1-inch two-barrel Nordenfelt shotgun were placed on the ship's stern.

The Croupe rapid-fire guns came from Turkish spoils of war. They were initially field guns converted into naval ones, when put on the gun carriages that were produced in Rodinos factory in Piraeus in cooperation with the Naval Base in 1918. That year the cargo ships *Daphne*, *Naxos*, *Adriatica*, *Yperohi*, *Akton*, *Arcadia*, and *Andros* arrived. By order of the Ministry, those ships had to be equipped with guns of various calibres, from 76 to 152 mm, as fast as possible. Nevertheless, the ships were clearly aged and they could not bear the 152 mm Vickers machine-guns. Thus, the ships were equipped with Croupe, Htchkiss, Cannae and other guns instead. Later, the commandeered fishing vessels *Nikolaos Sofos* and *Maria Sofou* were equipped with two 47/60 mm Cannae rapid-fire guns each.

In June 1918, the collier *Ermis* (previously named *Augusta Wilke*) was equipped with four American 76/50 mm rapid-fire guns of and they were placed at the length of the ship. The commandeered passenger ship *Nissos Halki*, later renamed *Meteoron*, was equipped with two 47 mm rapid-fire guns. The two steamships were providing military transports from

Piraeus to Propontis and Smyrna. The hospital ship *Constantinoupolis* was equipped with two 75 mm Croupe rapid-fire guns, the commandeered fishing vessel *Rafael* was equipped with a 47 mm Cannae rapid-fire gun, and the commandeered fishing vessel *Florence* was equipped with a Cannae rapid-fire gun. In the summer of 1922, the ship *King Constantine*, later named *Chios*, was equipped with 88 mm Croupe rapid-fire guns. During the same period, the commandeered passenger ship *Mykonos* was equipped with 57/50 mm Croupe rapid-fire guns, that were removed from the battleship *Feth-i Bülendi*.

In August 1922, the cargo ship *Aegean* was equipped with a 101.2 mm Bethlehem rapid-fire gun on its bow, a 65 mm Cannae and two 25.4 mm Nordenfelt guns on its navigation bridge. The artillery used to equip commandeered ships was the Cannae rapid-fire guns of old *Hydra* type battleships, 25 Croupe rapid-fire guns of the divested destroyers *Keravnos* and *Nea Genea*, and Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns. All that was possible, because there was enough ammunition supply and the staff knew how to use that supply, as they were 193 navy reservists,

The equipping operations were quite difficult, because no plan was drafted since the period of peace and none was available (69). In addition, those operations had to be executed as soon as possible and the Naval Base was unable to make the best of it. Finally, it should be noted, that the commandeered ships were randomly chosen, with no inspection being made. During the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Army, sixteen Skoda 10.5 mm mountain guns model 1916, were stored in a military deposit. The guns belonged to spoils of war of the Turkish Army (70), and the Turkish had removed the bolts. Those guns were considered necessary for the upcoming campaigns of the Greek Army in Asia Minor and the bolt manufacturing abroad was expensive and time-consuming. Therefore, it was assigned to the Greek Powder and Cartridge Company, PYRKAL, which cooperated with the Greek Army. However, PYRKAL did not undertake the assignment, due to lack of experience and the Military Department of the Ministry of National Defense asked the assistance of the General Navy Staff, which reassigned the bolt production to the Hellenic Arms Industry of the Naval Base.

The Naval Base had the needed experience, because it had produced small bolts in the past: In 1922 it had produced a bolt of a Croupe 7.5 mm field rapid-fire gun, which belonged to Bulgarian spoils of war, using the metal of an old Croupe navy gun bolt. Moreover, the

Naval Base possessed old guns and Croupe bolts, that could be used for gun manufacturing and the staff was experienced and able to undertake that operation. Finally, there was the appropriate machinery, such as lathes and planning machines.

The Naval Base would undertake this operation, only if the necessary metal was delivered, in case the available material was not enough. Thus, the order was given: 12 Skoda bolts would be manufactured and one would be sent as a sample. At the same time, pieces of Bessemer steel were delivered to Greece and were purchased by PYRKAL at a price of 5000 drachmas for the metal used in each bolt. It was calculated that after a forty-day period, the first two bolts would be delivered and after that, one would be sent every week until all twelve bolts were delivered. The manufacturing was carried out normally with the staff working night and day. Thus, within the first half of June 1921, the testing of the first four bolts was achieved in the firing range outside of PYRKAL. The testing was carried out successfully in attendance of PYRKAL manager I. Kallyvas, colonels Souliotis and Gkitarakos, lieutenant colonel Momferatos, battery officers of Skoda, captain I. Dimitriades, who was also the director of Naval Artillery, lieutenant A. Siokos, as well as artillery workshop members.

After the testing, the firearms were sent to Smyrna and, until the end of July 1921, the other eight Skoda bolts were manufactured and delivered successfully too. The labor costs of each bolt did not exceed 3.300 drachmas. During the same period, from April 1st 1921 to May 10th 1921, the artillery workshop manufactured two bolts that were used in 10.5 cm Croupe long guns. The material used in them came from the bolts of 26 cm Croupe guns that belonged to mine-boats *Aktion* and *Amvrakia*. The labor costs of each bolt did not exceed 4.250 drachmas.

During the same period, the armament of some Greek torpedo-boats with 7.5 cm Croupe rapid-fire guns was reinforced too. In the summer of 1921, those guns were placed on the torpedo boats *Niki*, *Aspis*, *Velos*, *Thyella*, *Longhi* and *Sfendoni*, after their 76mm Hotchkiss stern chasers had been removed. The Croupe rapid-fire guns were initially field guns coming from Turkish spoils of war of 1912, but were converted into rapid fire guns in the Naval Base workshops. Furthermore, the hydrographic vessel *Alfios* was reinforced with two 75/40mm Croupe rapid-fire naval guns that originally belonged to *Feth-i Bulend*. The lifeboat *Tenedos* of the Naval Base was reinforced with 65mm Cannae rapid-fire guns.

In July 1921, the Naval Base sent trained technicians to install gun emplacements in Mudanya. The equipment was prepared in the Naval Base and sent to its destination with the necessary material via passenger steamships that were conducting sailing schedules. In the same years, two Cannae guns at the gun emplacement of Nicomedia in Asia Minor were installed by the Naval Base. These guns were transported to Mudanya in October 1921, forming a special gun emplacement there, the eastern one. Head of operations was foreman E. Pefanis.

6. The explosion on destroyer *Leon*

On December 22 of 1921 the destroyer *Leon* had a severe accident, which rocked Greek public opinion. An explosion on *Leon* resulted in more than 70 fatalities and injured people. During the occupation of the Greek Fleet by British and French forces, destroyer *Leon* was also occupied and used by the French Navy. Reportedly, the French had changed *Leon's* boilers and, due to poor workmanship, the ship's speed was reduced. A little earlier, in 1917, another explosion had occurred in *Leon*, where French sailors had been killed. In August 1921, a general boiler inspection was conducted in the destroyer. The ship was intended to join *Iearx* in the squadron that would sail to Istanbul.

Destroyers *Leon* and *Iearx*, the warship *Psara* and the torpedo boat *Arethousa* were anchored on Xaveris coast in Piraeus for several days. The ships had replenished their ammunition and food supplies and were ready to sail to the Black Sea. In the same area, many ships were ready to sail as well, while the usual operations were being performed on the battleships. At 10:45 am sharp, there was a loud bang, which rocked the whole surrounding area. That sound was initially one torpedo that exploded, but after that the rest three exploded too, causing a lot of material damage and casualties. The explosions resulted in complete detachment of the *Leon's* stern (71) and the ship arrived at the port unmanned. Petty officer and torpedo technician, Davlakos, was considered responsible for the accident: Being inexperienced, Davlakos caused the explosion while configuring one of the torpedoes.

The explosion caused minor damage and casualties even to the passing ships, *Ierax* and *Psara*. The accident had severe consequences on the psychological state of the crew.

Nevertheless, ship-repair activities started immediately, while the wounded crew members were transported to Chatzikiriakeio Foundation, which served as a hospital in Piraeus. All Navy leaders arrived at the scene of the accident, declared it a day of national mourning and the flags of all the anchored ships in Piraeus were flown at half-mast.

B. (σσ. 356-388)

The relevant study had been assigned to the British engineer of the British Air Mission in Greece, Commander John Weston (72) and part of the former Zoo of Paleo Faliro had been selected as the site. The procedures were taking place at a fast pace, and as a result, in 1920 the first machines had arrived while the construction works of the buildings had already begun. However, the negative outcome of the Asia Minor Campaign inhibited the pace of construction of the plant.

Nonetheless, in 1923 the construction works started over under Weston's supervision, and in 1924 a delegation consisting of Sub-Lieutenant Papageorgiou and the midshipmen Philippas, Linos and Falconakis, left for Great Britain. Its objective was to select the most suitable type of aircraft for it to be constructed in Greece. In 1925 the installation of the machinery was completed and in the same year, a contract was signed between the Greek State and the British company Blackburn Aeroplane & Motor Co., which granted the company the right to build and repair the aircraft of Naval Aviation for five years. At the same time, the company undertook to train the Greek technicians. The company was subject to state control for the supervision of the abidance of the agreement's terms. In this way, during the first years of the plant's functioning, a significant number of Greek technicians were trained in - over a thousand - various fields, that were able to cover a large part of the state's needs.

In 1926 the first *Velos*-type seaplanes and torpedo launchers were manufactured and the supply of the Naval Aviation began immediately. After 1929, a contract with the company for another year and a half was signed. At the same time, *Avro* and *Bristol* trainer aircraft were received, as well as *Atlas*' type combat aircraft, with which the equipment of the Naval Aviation was supplemented.

In 1926 the Naval Aviation High Command (NAHC) was established, under the Ministry of Naval Affairs, which had under its control all the naval air forces, i.e. all aircraft services, all staging airfields and airports, the Naval Aviation Academy and the aircraft's plant Committee of Inspection.

Some accidents also occurred during this period. More specifically, on September 7, 1923, during a training flight by seaplane at Faliro Air Base, the pilots of the Navy Sub-Lieutenant Dimotakis, midshipman Agathoklis and Petty Officer Papageorgiou, drowned when their seaplane crashed into the sea due to a mechanical failure, while on March 8, 1928, a plane crash with an *Avro*-type training aircraft claimed the lives of the Petty Officer Bourtzoukidis and the Chief Petty Officer Xefloudas, pilot and engineer of the aircraft respectively.

c) Naval Base (73)

Since 1920 there has been the thought of transferring the Naval Base from the location of Arapi to Salamina on the opposite coast of Attica. This was imposed by the new weapons of the Navy, which required the creation of new services to support it. Engineer Colson of the British Mission mapped the area opposite Scaramanga and submitted a study, according to which the Naval Base could be moved there in order to have all the services concentrated. For this reason, the Scaramanga area was expropriated with a total of 41,661 acres.

Nevertheless, the Asia Minor Catastrophe overturned plans to build a new naval base, so it was decided to lift the expropriation of private lands and the original area was limited to the area of public space. The area that eventually continued to be held by the State is situated within the western and southwestern sides of Egaleo. This is a diverse, forested, mountainous and barren area, which belongs to the Monastery of Kleiston (EPMO) (74). By decree (75), the area of Scaramanga was demarcated, the boundaries of which remain almost the same today in land and sea.

Due to the financial difficulties caused by the effort to rehabilitate the refugees, the expropriated area remained unexploited until 1928. In 1929 the first service of torpedoes and mines was transferred to the opposite shore of Scaramanga and at the same time, the first mine depot was built.

d) Naval training (76)

At this time special emphasis is given to training, with the leadership of the Navy investing heavily in the future of the Weapon. In particular, in 1924 a new organization was established (77), which excelled in its simplicity and its reasonable approach to reality. The basic idea of the new organization was the progressive training of Navy Officers.

As a basis of the training remained the studentship at the Hellenic Naval Academy, which is exempted from the courses of excessive specialization and is just an introduction to the next Academies that the officer will attend. In other words, the officer is trained in schools throughout his whole career. The educational system of the new organization was a mixture of British and French methods adapted to the Greek temperament (78).

Furthermore, through the new organization, increased competencies are granted to the commander while a more civilized way of life is being introduced in the Academy. It is explicitly stated that upper-class cadets have no right to lower-class cadets unless they are on duty or acting on orders (79). At the same time, emphasis was placed on the stay on the ships to be as most enjoyable as it could, in order to strengthen the well-being of the cadets and the love for their profession.

In the context of the general changes and improvements of the Hellenic Navy training, the entrance exams have also changed. Once they reach the middle of the entrance exams, the cadets remain permanently in the Academy. At the end of the written exams, their physical and naval qualifications are being tested for three to six weeks and are taken into account for the final grading. Due to this test, more cadets had been selected from the necessary ones, but also those who were judged by the committee as not having the required qualifications were finally admitted to the Academy. This was beneficial because then they showed significant improvement in becoming valuable Navy executives. However, this system was generally not very effective.

The same organization set the minimum age for admission as a cadet to 15 years old and estimated that the number of cadets would rarely exceed eighty. The commander arranges almost no restrictions on the furloughs and exits of the cadets while he has the possibility to organize flights with aircraft and short dives with submarines for the purpose of training for the upper-class cadets. Lastly, it allows an Academy officer to teach more than one course.

An administratively and financially attached torpedo launcher boat adhered to the Academy, which was used for the winter sailing of the cadets.

The Academy, having entered a path of progress, managed to undertake the training of engineers cadets, aviation engineers cadets, midshipmen engineers, as well as foreign cadets.

As for the military ranks, it is worth mentioning that until that time the financial officers enlisted directly and the engineers were previously non-commissioned officers (80). The need for uniformity among officers led in 1925 (81) to the establishment of the Engineer Cadets Academy, which operated under the same legal framework as the Hellenic Naval Academy and under the same commander. Engineers cadets had a common course of study with naval cadets, but with their own, separate material. After graduating, they were sent for a year to the Naval Base crews for practical training.

In addition, a one-year General Training Academy for Sub-Lieutenant Engineers was established. Some of its graduates were sent abroad to specialize in the fields of Naval Architecture, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Internal Combustion Engines and Engineering. Those who specialized in Naval Architecture and Electrical Engineering were transferred to these fields, in which, after four years, the enlistment of officers who did not graduate from the Academy stopped. In 1925 the first 13 engineers cadets entered the Academy. The graduate engineers cadets met the expectations to the fullest and performed exceptionally well.

In 1927 the Organization of the Academy changes, which abolishes the Academy of Engineer Cadets. No distinction is made between combatant cadets and engineers. Their differences are detected in the courses and in the fact that during the summer training voyage the two upper classes of engineers board ships of the Fleet while the combatants board the training ship of the cadets. Furthermore, the engineers do not participate in the half of the six-month voyage of the graduates but are trained in the Academy instead.

The same regulation grants even more authorities to the commander, while the rights of the upper classes to the lower classes are abolished. It requires that the candidates are graduates

of the third class of high school (instead of second) while it introduces as a minimum age the age of 18 years instead of 16.

In addition, there is no longer any need for the candidates to remain in the Academy during the exam period and during the testing of the individual qualifications. At the same time, the annual ball of the Academy is also established. Lastly, in 1927, a graduate of the Academy of non-Commissioned Officers was admitted to the Academy, a case which was provided by the organization (83).

In 1928 a building was erected containing a drawing-room, laboratories and maintenance facilities. Its scientific equipment was ordered from Germany and received in 1931. In 1930 the Academy also undertook the training of Naval Aviation Engineer Cadets. Only one class of 13 cadets was trained and later transferred to the Hellenic Air Force that had since been created. Also, in 1930, three more schools of engineering were founded at the Academy: General Education of Senior Officers, Lieutenant Specialization and General Education of Subordinate Officers (84).

In 1925 the construction of the training ship *Aris* began (85), a sailboat with an auxiliary engine, which would be used by all the productive Academies of the Navy. Part of the cost was covered by a bequest of 21,000 pounds, left for this purpose by Georgios Miniakis, an expatriate from Egypt. The ship was built in Toulon, France, launched on 29/1/1927 and sailed to Greece in May 1928. At the end of June 1928, *Aris* began its first educational voyage (86). In order for the cadets and the crew to get used to the handling of the sails, the ship made small voyages in July with a base on Faliro bay. Then, it made a two-month voyage in the Aegean for more than 2,000 miles and stayed at sea for about 400 hours (87). Then, on the voyage of the graduates, it was sailing in Adriatic ports and the following year, on a summer voyage, it reached the Canary Islands.

The establishment of the War School in 1926 was an important development for the scientific training of officers. The forced alternately study of all the senior officers contributed to the development of critical thinking and of sound war doctrines. The establishment of the War School is considered the second most important development - after the establishment of the Hellenic Naval Cadets Academy - in the history of officer training.

In 1924, a new organization of the Academy was formed for the non-commissioned officers (88), which changed its name to Academy of Cadets Non-Commissioned Officers, which was based in the Central Gymnasium of Poros. This Academy was under the Supervisor of Subordinate Naval Education, while administratively it belonged to the Administrative Service Directorate of the Ministry of Naval Affairs.

The induction in this Academy was taking place at any time of the year. Candidates had to be over 14 years of age and under 16, literate, physically and mentally healthy and fit for active-duty service in the Navy, have the written consent of their parents or legal guardian, and finally, be registered in the male registers. In the same organization, the manner of induction of the students was determined while the number of them was determined by the Minister of the Navy upon a proposal of the Hellenic Navy General Staff.

After staying for a month at the Academy and before being admitted to the class, they made two voyages, each lasting two months and then entering the main Academy. The total course at the Academy consisted of eight classes lasting one semester each (4 actual months), so that the best of the candidates who could be transferred directly into the 5th grade remained at the Academy for two years. Every summer, after the courses, the non-commissioned officers cadets boarded the training ship and traveled for three months, together with the naval cadets.

Graduates from the 8th grade were admitted to the schools of application at the choice of each and according to the needs of the service and were called volunteer sailors if they had reached the age of 17; otherwise, they continued their education along with their colleagues. When they graduated from the School of Specialty, they were called graduate sailors and boarded the training ship, as far as possible with the naval cadets, and made an eight-month voyage. At the end of the voyage, they were called Leading Seamen and were admitted to the Academies of application of Petty Officers. When they graduated from the Petty Officers training schools, they made, if possible, a six-month voyage with the naval cadets, after which they were called Petty Officers, and with this rank, they entered the ranks of the Navy. If this voyage could not be carried out, they boarded an active ship, forming separate classes, without mixing with the rest of the ship's crew.

Article 12 of the Organization, as already mentioned, provided that a maximum of one graduate from the 8th grade of the Academy at the discretion of its Board of Education and if he had the necessary qualifications, could be admitted to the first grade of the Hellenic Naval Cadets Academy. As soon as they reached the age of 17, the non-commissioned officers cadets were sworn in and undertook ten years of compulsory service in the Navy.

In 1925, a new organization of the Academy was published (89). The seat of the Academy continued to be the Central Gymnasium of Poros but could be changed by ministerial decision while it was under the Supervision of Naval Training. The enlistment took place in the months of July and November and candidates between 15 and 17 years old were accepted but had to know the material of the fourth-grade elementary school. Candidates were examined by a committee of three combatants and two health officers. The committee was testing physical, mental as well as naval qualifications. The non-commissioned officers cadets who had reached the age of 17 were sworn in and undertook ten years of service in the Navy.

The highest-ranking non-commissioned officer cadet was called the Chief of the Non-Commissioned Officers Cadets while those who received the highest grade in the lower ranks were called the Chiefs of the rank to which they belonged. The Chief of the Non-Commissioned Officers Cadets wore a badge of three red rows, on top of which was a gold-plated laurel and myrtle branch open to the top, in the middle of which there was a gold-embroidered five-pointed star. The oldest immediately after the Chief cadets were appointed as Section Chiefs and an equal number of the next in line were appointed as non-commissioned officers of the constabulary. The badge of the Section Chiefs consisted of two red rows, above which there was a gold-embroidered asterisk, for the commanders a row with a gold-embroidered asterisk, and for the leaders a five-pointed gold-embroidered asterisk (90).

Training at the Academy was starting with monthly introduction courses (August 1st and December 1st), followed by six training classes (starting on September 15th and January 15th). There were three-month training voyages (from June 15 to September 15) with the training ship and the naval cadets, while there was also a special training after the end of the 6th class lasting 25 days in Seamanship. In addition, infantry exercises, practice on destroyers, gymnastics, Greek and mathematics were taught.

The non-commissioned officers cadets were then trained at the Academy of Shipping and after the end of the training there the non-commissioned officers were given a certificate of studies, after which they received the salary of a graduate volunteer sailor. Afterwards, they went to specialization schools (Shooters, Torpedo men, Electricians, etc.). After completing their studies at the specialization schools, they received a degree and were named graduate non-commissioned officers cadets. Then, they were leaving for a training voyage on a training or active ship of the Fleet for six months.

After the end of this stage, the non-commissioned officers cadets were promoted to Leading Seamen and studied again in the specialization schools, from where they obtained a second degree. They were then sent back to a training or active Fleet ship. After a year on the ship, they were called Petty Officers. From their graduation from the Hellenic Naval Academy until named Petty Officers, the non-commissioned officers cadets did not go to any other service, except the training ship or the ship of the Fleet for their training. Their sailor cap had a tally tied around and a distinctive anchor on the right arm over the badge (91).

Also, in this organization, a non-commissioned officer cadet from every upper class had the probability to be admitted to the Hellenic Naval Academy upon the proposal of the commander, the approval of the Naval Training Supervisor and the entrance exams. The difference was that the non-commissioned officer cadet was considered successful even if he received the lowest required grading for their admission to the Hellenic Naval Academy. The candidate non-commissioned officer cadet for the Hellenic Naval Academy was seconded and attended tutoring preparation courses at the expense of the Ministry of the Navy.

In 1928 a new organization of the Academy was published (92). The classes were set at three out of six and began on September 15 each year. The possibility of admitting a non-commissioned officer cadet to the Hellenic Naval Academy was retained, while the courses of Designs and English language elements were added. In June 1928 the non-commissioned officers cadets went on a training trip with the ship *Aris* together with the naval cadets.

12. The Venizelos' government (1928-1932) (93)

Eleftherios Venizelos took over the government again on July 3, 1928, after the coalition government could not withstand the pressure from the strikes in Northern Greece, which ended in clashes with the police and the army, but also because of the interventions of Venizelos himself.

In the first case, there were deaths and injuries from these clashes, while it was obvious that the influence of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was constantly increasing. In the second case, when the then leader of the Venizelist faction, G. Kafantaris, announced the settlement of the war debts between France and Greece, Venizelos on the same day sent him a letter criticizing him for the whole policy pursued. Venizelos, in particular, was opposed to the settlement of the publishing privilege and characterized the relations between the National Bank and the Bank of Greece as a political scandal. After this intervention, Kafantaris stated to Zaimis that he was resigning permanently and irrevocably, while the latter telegraphed to the President of the Republic, Pavlos Kountouriotis, who was on holiday in Hydra at the moment for the resignation of the government. P. Kountouriotis hurriedly returned to Athens and swore in a new government with E. Venizelos as president.

The elections were scheduled for August 19 with the narrow constituency majority system, as in the 1923 elections. Venizelos' goal was not just to become prime minister, but an omnipotent governor (94). In this context, Venizelos accepted in his party the candidates Papanastasiou, Michalakopoulos and Kondilis. The only one who remained distanced was Kafantaris, who formed his own parties in 25 regions. Venizelos swept the election in such a way that neither he nor his opponents expected it.

The Venizelos government was marked by a major shift in foreign policy, as it relegated traditional alliances with Britain and Yugoslavia to a second level and emphasized convergence with Turkey and Italy. In matters of internal organization of the country, his policy is distinguished for the many and productive projects.

In May 1929, the Council of State began to function, chaired by K. Ractivand (95). In the field of Education, the government of Venizelos with the Minister of Education, G. Papandreou, proceeds with the construction of 3,167 new school buildings, while at the same time, the educational reform was promoted with the introduction of the vernacular in high school while he abolished the "Greek schools" and established elementary and high

schools instead. During that period, many drainage, and anti-flood projects were carried out, especially in Macedonia, while in 1929 the Agricultural Bank was founded, which started operating in January 1930.

However, the great weaknesses of the Venizelos' government are located in the social sector, where the rise of the working class is treated with particular severity, as well as in the impossibility of bridging the gap between the supporters of Venizelos and those who opposed him, which is constantly deepening due to the intransigent stance of the Greek. In the first case, the following are typically mentioned: a) Law 4229 of 25 July 1929, which became known as a special illegal act (called “*idionymon*¹”), which effectively initiates the process of deportation as an administrative measure in the country, without a court decision, which left the whole issue to the police authorities, while it was a given that the measure would be extended to persons of non-communist ideology and b) Law 5060/1931 on the prosecution of the crimes committed by the abuse of the freedom of the press. With this measure, Venizelos tried to restrict the press, some of which were harshly critical of government officials.

In the second case, various moves by Venizelos could be mentioned, which irritated the anti-Venizelists. More specifically, they were annoyed by:

- the intention of Venizelos to elect N. Plastiras as a senator (96), which provoked the stormy reaction of the anti-Venizelists because they considered him the forerunner of the Trial of the Six;
- combined with the removal from the government of the moderate anti-Venizelists in the 1929 reshuffle.

It should also be noted that Venizelos provoked strong reactions from his greater supporters with various actions, such as the preference of Al. Zaimis instead of Kafantaris for President of the Republic when Pavlos Kountouriotis resigned due to old age but also as the legislation of the special illegal act “*idionymon*²” and the restriction of the free press. This caused divisions among Venizelists, while at that time Kondilis kept his distance from the

¹ NT : Officially known as Law 4229/1929, "On measures for the security of the social order and the protection of citizens' liberties." It was a law introduced by Eleftherios Venizelos in 1929 in Greece, aiming to address anarchism and the spread of communist ideas, which were considered a threat to the political system of the time. (Veremis, 1995).

² *ibid*, 121

Venizelist positions and turned to royalists, which would play an important role in the return of the king.

In national matters, due to the promotion of convergence with Italy and Turkey, national claims came in second place. The Corfu incident had already been forgotten, there was no talk of the Dodecanese, while the refugees from Asia Minor had to finally forget the dream of returning to their homes.

Finally, Venizelos became very actively involved in naval equipment issues, contradicting the views of Navy officers. This position of Venizelos on the issue of naval equipment will lead to the lack of naval units when they are needed more, ie in World War II.

13. The 1935 coup d'état attempt (97)

In 1932 the situation for the Venizelists was very different than in 1928. In the elections of September 1932, the two major parties resulted in an even split vote, while the former military politicians Kondilis and Hatzikiriakos had joined the political party of Laiko Komma (People's Party). As for the commissioned officers, only Plastiras continued to support Venizelos.

In the early hours of March 6, 1933, it was clear from the first election results that the Venizelist faction would lose the election. This angered Plastiras, who decided to make a move to prevent the occupation of power by the political party of Laiko Komma (People's Part) of P. Tsaldaris. However, Plastiras did not find support from the other important commissioned officers, General Othoneos, the commander of the First Army Corps K. Manetas as well as Rear Admiral Demestihis.

Plastiras' movement due to the reaction and distance of the above commissioned officers led to a military transitional government under Othoneos for four days and then the prime ministership was given to P. Tsaldaris, who on March 10 formed his government. In this government, G. Kondylis participated as Minister of Defense and A. Chatzikyriakos as Minister of the Navy.

As for the Navy, although there was almost no involvement in the 1933 movement, various of its officers were prosecuted. Most of those persecuted will form the core of the later 1935 movement. The 1933 movement was the forerunner of the 1935 movement, which would be the essential end of the Republic.

From 1933 to 1935 intense processes took place within the Venizelos world for the establishment of a movement. E. Venizelos, as in the movement of 1933, does not hold a clear position (98), while the Venizelos faction has been divided into interest groups and subgroups (99). It was under those circumstances that an assassination attempt was made on Venizelos himself on Kifissias Avenue on June 6, 1933.

New tensions arose with the signing of the Greek-Turkish pact on September 14, 1933 and with the subsequent signing in Athens of the friendship and non-aggression pact between Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania. The signing of this pact was dictated by the Bulgarian armaments. There was also a secret protocol in this pact, which presupposed action in the event of a conflict between a Balkan state and a non-Balkan power. Venizelos considered this to be directed against Italy and overturned the convergence policy he had drawn up. He hurried to Athens and succeeded in convening a council of all political leaders, in which it was revealed that the relevant protocol really exists.

Although the government initially agreed during the vote of the pact by the Parliament and the Senate to make an interpretative statement that Greek military engagement against Italy was ruled out, then, on April 7, 1934, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, D. Maximos, stated that the Protocol shall continue to be in force in accordance with Article 3.

This statement provoked a storm of reactions from the Venizelists while Venizelos himself launched an article attack on the “*Elefthero Vima*” newspapers and his eight articles gained such popularity that the government finally refused to sign the military agreements of the Balkan pact.

A. Hatzikiriakos, as Minister of the Navy, landed at the Naval Base in February 1935 and, speaking about *G. Averof* to his assembled captains, drew attention to the rumors circulating about the movement, telling them to be vigilant in case of attempts to seize ships. On the other hand, A. Chatzikyriakos had taken care to put his own people in key positions of the

leadership of the Navy. He had appointed Rear Admiral P. Roussen as Commander of the Fleet and Naval Base and Roussen's chief correspondent for the Fleet was Commander A. Pinotsis and for the Naval Base, Commander A. Siokos. Rear Admiral P. Dimoulis had been appointed Chief of Hellenic Navy General Staff, who also had the duties of Inspector General of the Hellenic Navy.

In its first phase, the movement manifested itself in three places in Athens, on the afternoon of Friday, March 1, 1935. Both of these have been cited by historians as distractions (100). Chronologically, the movement of the Navy preceded the other two by 45 minutes.

At the appointed time, a group of 40 disaffected, retired, and incumbent officers led by Admiral I. Demestihis and Captain Kolialexis was in Perama. They passed to the Naval Base with steamboats but the facilities were occupied by a section of the insurgents led by Kolialexis. Chief correspondent Siokos tried to react, resulting in his death, while Roussen was placed under restraint. The other part of the insurgents under Demestihis was occupied by *Georgios Averof*. The cruiser *Elli* the destroyers *Psara* and *Leon*, the torpedo boat *Niki* and the submarines *Katsonis* and *Nirefs* joined. An attempt by the artillery from the land to cancel the departure of the ships failed.

However, while the Navy movement had initially succeeded, one wrong move would eventually lead to its failure. Insurgent movement was expected from the 3rd and 4th Army Corps in Northern Greece and the arrival of the Fleet in Thessaloniki or Kavala in order to reinforce them. However, Major Thomas Sfetsos, who was to carry the slogan of mobilization to Thessaloniki, conveyed the slogan of postponement.

This happened most likely because, when Sarafis was about to leave for Macedonia the day before, the latter, who would be overseeing the movement in Northern Greece on behalf of the three-member committee, noticed suspicious movements at the train station. Thinking that they have been noticed, he told Sfetsos to leave the next morning at 11 alone and wait for his phone call until 9 in the morning. If he did not receive a phone call, it would mean that the movement was postponed. Sfetsos did not receive the phone call and conveyed to Thessaloniki the signal for the postponement.

The Fleet, not receiving any signal from Northern Greece, headed to Crete (101), where El. Venizelos was. Venizelos, watching the ships sailing in Crete and not to the north, had already understood the impending failure of the movement, but had no choice but to embrace it and take command.

On the afternoon of March 2, one of the three divisions of the 3rd Army Corps revolted, while the next morning, the commander of the 4th Army Corps, Lieutenant General D. Kammenos, joined the movement. However, instead of attacking Thessaloniki with all their combined forces, they maintained a defensive stance by the decision of Kammenos, who was trying to organize a front on the river Strymon, where he blew up all but one of the bridges. At the same time, he announced a mobilization, which, however, yielded only 5,000 men due to lack of supplies.

The ships *G. Averof*, *Psara* and *Elli* and the submarine *Katsonis* (Κατσώνης) arrived in Kavala on March 5 and after a meeting between Kammenos, Kolialaxis and Demestihis, it was decided to sail to Lesbos, Chios and Samos to achieve the accession of the guards and the arrival of volunteers. *G. Averof* and *Psara* sailed while *Katsonis* and *Elli* remained in Kavala. By March 7, the three islands had acceded. On March 9, the two ships sailed back to Souda, while on the same day the ship *Niki* sailed from there to transport 60 volunteers to Kavala. Due to the weather, however, he sailed to Chios and finally surrendered there.

The outbreaks of the revolt in Athens were eliminated almost immediately by Kondilis, who had now become the master of the situation. At the same time, on March 2, I. Metaxas took over as Minister without Portfolio and on the same day, Sophocles Dousmanis took over as Minister of the Navy. Metaxas set up a decryption service at the Ministry of the Navy, while with the help of the Minister of Finance and temporarily Minister of National Economy, he managed to borrow five Avia-type bombers from Yugoslavia. These bombed, but without particular results, the positions of Kammenos. Kondilis moved his seat to Macedonia to face the forces of Kammenos, whose forces failed to put up significant resistance. The movement had collapsed.

At the Naval Base, painstaking efforts were made to return the remaining ships to a state of readiness. Among other problems, the damage caused by the Venizelists when leaving had to be repaired. On March 9, the destroyers *Koundouriotis*, *Spetsai* and *Psara* sailed north.

When they arrived in Kavala, they began to attack the ship *Elli*. *Katsonis* took refuge while diving in the port, while *Elli* responded to the shots. The three destroyers, which also received mountain artillery fire from the mainland, turned south, while the stern cannons of *Koundouriotis* continued to fire. The three destroyers returned to the Naval Base because there was a fear of a possible landing of Venizelists. Eventually, this move proved to be correct as the movement collapsed without the possible sinking of *Elli*.

The insurgent officers of the Army and Navy (Commanders E. Bouzanis and E. Georgouloupoulos who were aboard *Elli*) crossed the border with Bulgaria in Macedonia, where they sought asylum. In Smyrna, Lieutenant Commander A. Zizilas, commander of one of the three merchants ordered by the insurgents, took refuge. In the other two, Lieutenant Commander G. Kallianesis was arrested in Alexandria and deported to Naples, and Lieutenant Commander E. Tazedakis was arrested in Heraklion, where he had gone to pick up volunteers. Captain Th. Nikotsaras left the Naval Base with the lifeboat Tenedos and outside Fanari of Kassandra he met *Elli*, which was sailing with the rest of his crew and transported it to the Naval Base.

The other insurgents of *Elli* had boarded *Katsonis*. *Katsonis* sailed from Kavala and to Patmos where all the cinematographers, staff and passengers disembarked. Captain Georgakopoulos called his current Chief Officer, N. Perdikas (102), and told him that he relied on him to return the ship to Greece without falling into the hands of the Italians.

The Chief Officer after the disembarkation of the latter, noticed that the confidential and secret books of the ship had disappeared. As a result, he shot himself in the heart. The Italians towed the submarine to Lakki of Leros and transported by plane the dying Chief Officer in Rhodes. They then arrested and handed over a Leading Seaman marshaller, who had taken possession of the ship's secret and confidential books. Eventually, *Katsonis* was handed over to Greece again.

Psara, *Leon* and the submarine *Nirefs* were abandoned by their officers in Souda. They boarded *G. Averof*, where Venizelos and his wife also boarded. The ship headed for the Italian-occupied Kasos, where they disembarked on a deserted shore. Then, *G. Averof* headed to Sounio, where the ships *Thiella* and *Sfendoni* were waiting for him. Captain Ch.

Konialis boarded there as captain and Lieutenant Commander K. Filippou as Chief Officer, who led it back to the Naval Base.

The 1935 movement would lead to the clearcutting of Navy personnel through a court-martial, although several executives later returned to action due to World War II. In the moral field, the 1935 movement left open wounds that, while with the outbreak of World War II it would seem as if they had closed, would reappear more severely about a decade later.

14. The Hellenic Navy until 1936 (103)

a) Fleet

At this time there is a divergence of views between Venizelos and the officers of the Navy regarding the direction that the Fleet should follow. Navy officials believe the Fleet should acquire heavy vessels, while Venizelos believed that it should have only destroyers, submarines and aircraft intended only for defense (104). At the same time, the Navy's armaments are subordinated to Venizelos' political and, above all, diplomatic policy level. This diplomatic level had two axes, a Greek-Turkish and a Greek-Italian approach.

The Greek Prime Minister, among other reasons, wanting to show his sincere faith in the Greek-Turkish friendship, decided to decommission the warships of *Kilkis* and *Limnos*, whose repair of engines and boilers had just been completed instead of 80,000 pounds, and finally the complete rejection (105) of the ship *Salamis* with a significant burden on the State (106).

On the other hand, the Greek fleet also fell victim to economic hardship (107). In the same diplomatic context, the four *Dardo*-type destroyers: *Koundouriotis*, *Spetsai*, *Hydra* and *Psara*, were ordered and acquired by the Italian shipyards Ansaldo. This market, which served diplomatic purposes, is generally considered a failure in terms of ship quality (108). Two torpedo boats were then purchased from Thornycroft in England.

The two torpedoes, which were simply named T1 and T2, were two insignificant and misplaced purchases. Both were sunk in 1941 by the Germans. This armaments policy

during this period will cost the Navy World War II. However, the composure of officers and crews will balance the shortages of equipment and combat naval units.

b) Naval Aviation

In 1928 the Prime Minister E. Venizelos decided to unite the two Air Forces, the Navy and the Military under a single and separate administration. In this way he aimed to follow the emerging developments in Western Europe. The first attempt to establish an Air Ministry in a European state was made by Germany in 1916, while a year later an autonomous ministry was established in Great Britain.

Venizelos assigned the relevant study for the organization of the Air Ministry to the aviator Alexandros Zannas. The latter visited many European countries and finally, on December 5, 1929, the Government submitted to the Parliament a bill for the establishment an Air Ministry. On December 19, 1929, Law 4451 was passed on the establishment of the Air Ministry (On Establishing Air Ministry). With this law, the Navy and the Air Force were merged into one administration, one Ministry (109).

The first Air Ministry was El. Venizelos and Deputy Minister was Al. Zannas. The newly formed Air Force continued to have two different commands, the Naval Air Command based at P. Faliro and the Military Air Command, based in Thessaloniki, because most of the Army air forces were in Macedonia.

There was also a Permanent Aviation Council in the Ministry: the council was chaired by the Minister of Aviation and its members were the heads of the two air administrations (Navy and Military), the director of the Office of the Minister and the respective director or department head.

Many officers of the Navy are decisively involved in this first organization of the Air Force. More specifically: Captain Petros Voulgaris as Director of the Air Force (110), Commander Alexandros Levidis as Director of Civil Aviation, Lieutenant Andreas Kiriakidis as Director of Meteorology and Lieutenant Commander Michael Zarokotis as Director of Naval Aviation.

C. (σσ. 389-414)

c) Naval Training

In 1929, a new organization of the Hellenic Naval Academy is established (111). This new organization establishes the institution of training regulations and of internal service regulations. There is the right to participate in the entrance examinations for a graduate of the Non-Commissioned Officers School.

The six-month special training in seamanship for graduates is abolished, and an eight-month attendance at the School is established for the Graduate Cadets Engineers. In addition, the seats of the courses, if held by teaching staff, are equated with those of professors of the Schools of the National Technical University of Athens.

At that period, the armament policy of the Navy had limited the Fleet to light vessels. This meant that a Midshipman Officer had to be upgraded from a trainee to a substantive Navy officer. Training was also oriented towards this direction, which was achieved that through courses and lectures. The time required for this new training direction was found by cutting some theoretical courses and printing educational texts so that the cadets would not have to take notes.

In 1928, all naval cadets subscribed to the journal “Naval Review”, while on 4 June, 1931, the 25 years of the Academy’s operation at its permanent headquarters were celebrated and the unveiling of a monument for the fallen of the School during the wars, took place. This monument was the work of the sculptor Georgios Dimitriades from Athens. It was a composition of rocks with a marble seagull on top (112). On that occasion, a commemorative album of memories was also published describing the Academy and its activities (113).

From this, it is known that the daily schedule of the cadets included 9.5 hours of classes, studying and training, 8 hours of sleep and 6.5 hours of rest, meals and sports. During winter, two special trainings in seamanship were carried out with a destroyer or a torpedo boat, one lasting four hours and the other twenty-four hours. The Academy’s sports program included

track and field events, sports, marksmanship, fencing, tennis, rowing, horseback riding and sailing. The teaching staff consisted of 36 professors, 6 prefects and 5 Non-Commissioned Officers instructors. The Academy's facilities provided an engineering lab, a foundry, a machine shop, a drawing room, a chemistry and electrical laboratory, nautical and maritime instruments, meteorological instruments, a library and a photographic room.

In 1936, the Academy undertook the training of Logistics, Harbor Crops, Naval Architecture and Electrical Engineering officers. Logistics officers were directly commissioned and the problem of diversity and heterogeneity caused by this, had already arisen. In 1929, the School of Logistics Midshipmen Cadets was established with a duration of eight-month, but it never operated.

On the other hand, the Port Authority, founded in 1919, did not have its own school. Port Officials, after their classification, attended briefings on their future duties. Initially, these briefings took place in a room at the National Technical University of Athens, but since 1931 they were held at the Seamen's Pension Fund facilities, with traineeship at *the Seaman's House (Oikos Nautou)* and the *Maritime Labour Office*. Their training was completed after a three-month stay at the Central

All Naval Architects and Electrical Engineering Officers used to be engineers who had attended retraining. In 1935, by decree, two Electrical Engineering Midshipmen and one Naval Architect were directly classified (114). They would attend, for eight months, a school in the facilities of the Hellenic Naval Academy or on a ship. The same decree provided for the classification of five Logistics Midshipmen Cadets. A later decree (115) defined the qualifications required for the classification of Logistics Midshipmen. Specifically, to be under 25 years old and to have a degree from the *School of Economics and Business* or the *Law School* or the *School of Mathematics* or of *Physical Sciences* of the University.

Between March and April of 1936, the *School of Logistics Midshipmen Cadets* and the *School of Naval Architecture and Electrical-Engineering Midshipmen Cadets* were established, where also Port Authority Cadets were trained (116). All Schools of the Hellenic Naval Academy had a common Administration, Directorate of Studies and Administrative Hierarchy. The training process consisted of theoretical courses and a

training cruise on the ship *Aris*. Their training was subject to the provisions of the organization and the regulation of the Hellenic Naval Academy.

In April 1936, the new cadets were as follows: two electricians, one naval architect, five logistics and eight port authority, who formed a single class following Superintendent's order. In September, when the two electricians and the naval architect graduated, their school was tacitly repealed (118). The study of Logistics and Port Authority cadets continued as per normal. Until 1940, on average 6 Logistics and 11 Port Authority cadets were admitted each year (119).

In addition, the operation of the School aiming to Reserve Officers originating from the merchant navy was specified by the Decree *On the School of Reserve Line Officers of the Royal Hellenic Navy*, published in the Official Government Gazette on 10 March 1936, Section D, Issue No 126. This School is located on the island of Poros, under the supervision of the Senior Superintendent of Naval Schools (SSNS), either in a "Naval Establishment" or on a ship. The training at the School lasts four months and its Superintendent, who may also be a Director of Studies, is a senior line officer, ordered by the Minister of Naval Affairs upon a proposal of the Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff (hereinafter HNGS). He has a subordinate line officer, as an assistant. The SSNS appoints the officers who would teach. A teacher may choose to teach more than one subject.

The subjects are the following: knowledge and use of artillery (infantry exercises, gunnery gym, basic elements of artillery fire direction, and basic elements of ammunition), knowledge on mines and torpedoes (basic description of torpedoes, mines, bouncing bombs, minesweeping, torpedo firing and mine laying), knowledge of communication, electrical principles and regulations. Reserve Midshipmen wear the uniform of a Line Midshipman of the Royal Hellenic Navy, *except that the rank insignia stripes consist of two gold laces of 4 mm each surmounted with a circle looping the upper rank lace to curve forward and upward.*

Concerning the training of the Non-Commissioned Officers (hereinafter NCO), the Organization of NCOs Cadets School, published in 1928, was amended in 1929 (120) as regards the exams process for the entry to School, qualifications, scoring system and training cruises. In 1936, the NCOs Cadets School was repealed and started the enlistment of naval

trainees. The objective of the naval trainees' enlistment was the selection of volunteer sailors, after an onboard training of 18 to 30 months.

The captain of the training ship ensured their training in accordance with the general guidelines of the SSNS; he also appointed a Line Officer as Naval Cadets Supervisor, for the surveillance of the military and naval training, who complied with the curriculum of each course along with the grade and exams book. After the completion of their training, the naval trainees were able to voluntarily enlist or to demand their discharge. An organized NCOs School no longer existed ashore, while the training of the naval trainees (courses, grades, and exams) was not set by the Organization.

Chapter 9

World War II

Preparation and the Battle in Greece (1936-1941)

- **General Introduction**

After the turbulent Interwar period, Ioannis Metaxas becomes the Prime Minister of Greece, in 1936. The Metaxas' dictatorship emerged as a result of two things: the failure of Venizelists to establish a stable democracy, free from turmoil and military movements, as well as the lack of cooperation between the two major political parties (123), the Liberal Party and the Laiko Komma (People's Party), towards a solution to the country's crisis, while the events were leading to a new World War with the participation of Greece being certain.

During the period 1936-1940, calm prevailed and the state had already begun military preparations. Funds were allocated to the Armed Forces, mainly to the Army, less to Air Force and even less to the Navy. Ioannis Metaxas was particularly concerned about the international developments; his political directions regarding the Navy were presented at a meeting of the Supreme Naval Council, in the autumn of 1936. According to his estimation, Greece would enter war on the side of Great Britain (124).

The flagship program of the country and its naval preparation aimed to prepare Greece adequately as G. Britain's ally regarding its naval forces, in order to be able to contribute significantly to the alliance, relying on the utilization of its geographical position. On this basis, attention was directed mainly to coastal fortification and to ensure *safe* inland seaways and bases in order to facilitate the work of the naval forces (125).

At the same time, efforts were made to protect maritime transportation, which were necessary for both military mobilization and concentration of troops as well as for the country's supply. The focal point of the Navy's military preparation, during the period of 1936-1940, was the organization of Naval Commands (127).

In 1941, while the Germans invaded Greece and were moving towards Athens, the Greek fleet was exiled to Alexandria, in order to continue the fight against the Axis Powers, on the Allied side. It is necessary to stress out that not only some ships departed towards Alexandria, but the entire Greek naval forces (128). This insurmountable collective achievement (129) connects the modern naval forces with the ancient Greek naval tradition.

It was a similar accomplishment to the one of the Athenian vessels which although left the city in the hands of Persians at first, afterwards engaged in battles and defeated the invaders. At the same time, in Greece, naval officers, either at the *Directorate-General of the Navy*, an agency established in the early days of the Occupation under the Ministry of National Defense of the collaborationist government, either at other Greek Resistance organizations, were secretly organizing the mission to send officers to the exiled Navy in Alexandria, in order to reinforce its fight against the Axis (130).

- **Hellenic Navy, from 1936 to 1941**

- * **Naval Commands**

The creation of Naval Commands constituted the main strategic choice for the Navy. The readiness of these Naval Commands will be reviewed on the basis of three pillars: coastal defense, anti-aircraft defense and observatories. A more detailed reference to each Command follows below.

Regarding coastal defense, there were made efforts for its organization, in the past, in cases of tensions in external relations or in cases of Greece's involvement in previous wars. However, these efforts attempts were temporary and all the studies remained unapplied.

The legislative Decree of 1926 (132) provided guidance concerning the country's coastal division and organization into Naval Defense Areas (NDA), the boundaries of which would be defined each time by a Decree, on a proposal from HNGS.

These Naval Defense Areas aimed to defend coastal areas against hostile maritime, air or even combined offensives, the systematic organization of the antisubmarine defense, the protection of maritime transportation and the most profitable use and exploitation of naval and air forces.

However, despite the above-mentioned Decree, no action was taken until 1935, when the Superior Command of Local Defense (SCLD) was established by the Permanent Circular of 9/11/1935, published by the Ministry of Naval Affairs, with jurisdiction in both, coastal and anti-aircraft defense. By the Decree of 20/12/1935 (133), the country's coastline was divided into six Naval Defense Areas as follows:

- Western Greece (NDA-1), based in Patras
- Crete (NDA -2), based in Chania
- Southern Aegean (NDA-3), based in Piraeus
- Euboea (NDA-4), based in Chalkida
- Northern Aegean (NDA-5), based in Thessaloniki
- Eastern Islands (NDA-6), based on the island of Mytilene.

Especially since there was no relevant experience in such fortifications, qualified German officers were called to Greece. Firstly, the German Vice-Admiral (retired) *Kinzel*, then the German Major *Habicht* of the Corps of Engineers and Lieutenant-Commander *Mirus*, indicated the appropriate locations for the installations of artilleries and thereafter compiled the general fortification plans for the coastal and the anti-aircraft defense. After the departure of the German officers, the project carried on quite successfully, by Greek officers and civil engineers of the Superior Command of Local Defense (SCLD), which was renamed as Superior Command of Coastal Defense (SCCD).

The spare guns of the battleship *Limnos* and other decommissioned ships were employed as coastal batteries. Even the guns of the cruiser *Elli* were used, which were removed during its reconstruction, while for the forts of the Thermaic Gulf, the guns of the Turkish ironclad warship *Feth-i Bülend* were used, which were already emplaced there. The true achievement for Hellenic Navy was, especially, the transport and the successful emplacement on the island of Aegina, of the two twin gun turrets of the battleship *Limnos* –weighing 900 tons each. The total expenditures for the coastal fortifications along with some expenses for anti-aircraft defense (AAD) and for the observation posts did not exceed 288 million drachmas, thereby fulfilling the objective of achieving as much economy as possible (134). On the eve of the Greco-Italian war, except very few details, the coastal defense was in an overall, complete state of readiness.

According to the orders of the HNGS, along with the coastal defense, the Superior Command of Coastal Defense assumed the development and organization of the Navy's active anti-aircraft defense, under the guidance of brought-in German officers. On the basis of an agreement between the HNGS and the Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS), there would be a single anti-aircraft defense for the areas of the capital, Piraeus and Naval Station of Salamis, as a more cost-saving option.

For the implementation of this plan, four main artillery batteries would be disposed by Hellenic Navy, and the rest necessary batteries would be disposed by the Army. However, due to its heavy needs, the Army could not acquire in time sufficient anti-aircraft (A/A) artillery for the overall requirements of the Hellenic front and rear area.

For the anti-aircraft defense of the rear area, i.e bases, ports, supply centers, major roads and important population centers, defense equipment was disposed mainly by Hellenic Navy with relatively fewer equipment available by the Army.

These increased needs for A/A equipment were covered by the reserve which was designated for the anti-aircraft defense of a potential fleet advanced Base; however, even if it was necessary to create one, there would not be any A/A equipment available for its protection (135). For the rear area air defense, the country was organized into large parts of 80-100 km radius, which would be governed with mobilization by the so-called "Area Air

Defense Commands” (AADC), which would be based in the center of each area. The Navy’s Anti-Aircraft Defense Units, due to mobilization would integrate into various Area Air Defense Commands, depending on their position.

An irregularity arose with the creation and organization of the active air defense of the Athens-Piraeus-Naval Station area, which, although it was exclusively a Navy achievement, with all the material provided by the Navy and reinforced by the active anti-aircraft means of the ships located in the Naval Fortifications area, and despite the existence of a regulation jointly drafted by the General Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, according to which the command of this area would be transferred to the Navy and specifically to the naval defense area of Saronic Gulf (NDA-3) as soon as it was organized, nonetheless, the command fell to a major general (commander of Air Defense Area A), whose staff did not include a single Navy officer.

When the war was declared, Vice-Admiral Oikonomou assumed command, but with the clarification that regarding the military action of this Command, it would still be dependent of Area Air Defense Command/A (136).

Lastly, HNGS in consultation with HAGS, started considering the formation of a dense sea and air surveillance network by installing observatories -which the General named *Surveillance Stations*- at crucial points within mainland of Greece, its coasts and islands that were considered of key and strategic importance. The so-called observatories would survey the surrounding sea and land area and would be in charge of the dissemination of intelligence concerning the appearance or activity of any hostile vessel or aircraft. In this endeavor, HNGS was benefited a lot by the geographical conditions of the country with its numerous islands and its long and indented coastline.

For the definition of the appropriate installation locations, HNGS took into consideration, except the selection of each position from the map, also:

1. The intelligence provided by the Ministry of Transport concerning the existing telephone and telegraphic network, as well as the possibilities of its extension
2. The existing lighthouses, and
3. The intelligence provided by the competent local authorities, concerning the existing customs guardhouses, gendarmerie posts etc. the buildings and personnel of which could be used.

The Superior Command of Coastal Defense ensured the water supply, the accommodation of the personnel etc. The communication between observatories was ensured through their connection to the existing telephone and telegraphic network; and wherever that was not possible, through mobile radio units, ordered from abroad or manufactured by Naval Radiotelegraphic Service Directorate (NRSD).

At the outbreak of war, the majority of the observation posts attained a high level of preparedness, thanks to the operations of the Superior Command of Coastal Defense and the Naval Radiotelegraphic Service, in combination with the cooperation of the Ministry of Transportation. In fact, some of them have been operating for training purposes as well. The Air and Sea Alarm Monitoring Service (ASAMS) was established in the underground bunker of Mount Lycabettus, where the radio station was also installed, and was even placed under the jurisdiction of the Director of Naval Radiotelegraphic Service. Any information concerning the appearance of vessels or aircrafts ended up there.

The following is a short account of the most important Naval Commands, listed geographically: firstly, is presented the action of NDA-1, under which jurisdiction was Western Greece (an area which was closer to the enemy), then the action of NDA-3, in which jurisdiction falls the greater area of Saronic Gulf, as well as the subordinate (i.e. Saronic Gulf Fortifications) or relating thereto authorities (i.e. A/A Defense, Naval Radiotelegraphic Service).

- **Western Greece Naval Defense Area (NDA-1)**

The Command of the Western Greece Naval Defense Area was practically established in January 1939, when Captain Evangelos Flokas took on the organization of this new department. NAP-1 fulfilled its duties which were related to the provision of logistics support to the combatant members of Hellenic Army (such as supply and transportation), the undertaking of land, sea, and air defense projects, the intelligence services, the passive air-defense, logistics, communications, medical service as well as the operation of the antisubmarine barriers and minesweeping.

Already, since the time of peace, there were still some pending projects in Araxos, such as the works concerning the passive air defense; these had not been executed due to the required expenditure.

The Greco-Italian war started with an intense bombardment of Patras, resulting in the destruction of a part of the city (137). Although, most of military and other public services were transferred out of the city, the Command of NDA-1 remained there, even after the completion without delay of the issues concerning recruitments, manning of services and concentration, mobilization and transport of military forces to destination ports. At the same time, the Naval Commands of Corfu, Ambracian Gulf and Thesprotia were manned and organized (the Naval Command of Thesprotia however, was later repealed, subjecting under the Command of Corfu), and shortly thereafter, were those of Northern Epirus and Missolonghi.

After the completion of the first phase of the war, relating to the mobilization and the concentration of troops, in accordance with the drawn-up plans, this Naval Defense Area entered the second and more permanent phase of the war; and this was related to the replenishment of the troops fighting in Epirus, which was mainly achieved with the use of waterborne vessels. However, due to frequent air raids, this task had become extremely difficult. Especially the areas of Corfu, Preveza and the access to the Gulf of Patras had suffered many air raids. The transport was performed overnight, mostly with motor vessels, which because of their low displacement did not constitute a prime target. The more significant transportations such as those of men, animals, equipment and ammunition constituted an exception, and therefore were performed by using steamships either as a part of a convoy or individually, usually escorted by smaller vessels.

During this five-month phase, there were barely any casualties owing to the active anti-aircraft defense and also to the enemy's misfires.

The active ground anti-aircraft defense was predominantly established in Patras, Preveza, Agioi Saranta (Sarandë), and in the Missolonghi- Agrinio region; it performed successfully by preventing hostile aircrafts from operating low-level flights. Unfortunately, fighter sweep flights were not performed, resulting in the undisturbed activity of hostile aircrafts in higher altitudes. Thus, the Surveillance Network was fully operational and the results have been of great benefit for the population. The gradual organization of the passive defense means reduced to minimum the number of human casualties and allowed port workers to perform loading and unloading more methodically and fighting any restlessness.

In this context, Port Authorities also worked earnestly, while waterborne vessels (such as warships, auxiliary vessels, hospital ships, commandeered cargo or passenger ships) and mainly the motor vessels bore the brunt of military transport. The Navigation Control Bureau undertook the regulation of the entire waterborne traffic in the region of Western Greece, as assigned by HNGS and based on the local needs. This mission was successfully concluded by this Bureau, after organizing an authority for monitoring moving or anchored vessels, as well as organizing the process of loading and unloading in ports to be rapid; the latter was carried out either with the presence of Port Committees (Patras), or with the presence of Port Commanders (Argostoli, Corfu), or along with Line Officers, in areas where closer surveillance was required due to higher mobility and greater enemy pressure (i.e. Preveza, Agioi Saranta/Sarandë).

During the war between Greece and Germany, all Western Greece areas were heavily bombarded resulting in the loss of almost all waterborne vessels. At the same time, many regions were seriously damaged by mine-laying (Patras, Missolonghi, Pylos, Pyrgos etc.). The dispersion and concealment measures taken only helped the reduction of casualties. The intense air activity of the enemy affected the morale of the personnel and interrupted the telephone communications with ports and areas of Western Greece. On that account, the Surveillance Network operated defectively, resulting to aerial raids with adverse effects on the population. The final days of war, all telephone and telegraphic communications of the Service with Athens were permanently severed.

- **Naval Defense Area of Saronic Gulf (NDA-3)**

Captain Evangelos Bakopoulos was the Chief Officer of NDA-3, which was founded one year before the declaration of war; therefore, due to lack of time and staff it was still in embryo in terms of means to face the needs of the war –despite the efforts made by the Chief Officer. At the outbreak of war, a significant number of officers was mobilized and utilized to respond rapidly to this situation, while at the same time they filled the administrative posts at the subordinate to NDA-3 Naval Commands, which were the following:

- N. Command of Crete (under A/NDA because of the presiding of Rear-Admiral)
- N. Command of Saronic Gulf fortifications

- N. Command of Cyclades
- N. Command of South Euboean Gulf
- N. Command of Milos
- N. Command of Samos
- N. Command of Poros and
- N. Command of Isthmia.

The main official constraint was the failure to predict from the time of peace, the inclusion- after the declaration of war- of various military services of Piraeus- Port Office- Port Police- Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) and Fire Department, under the administration NDA-3. The absence of such a law led to irregularities and difficulties in the performance of the Chief Officer's duties, throughout the war. These were mainly due to excessive touchiness and to overlap of responsibilities, which were smoothed out with great difficulty by the relative interventions of the Commander-in-Chief of HNGS.

The Personnel Department of this Service ensured the manning of warships, Saronic Gulf fortifications, observatories and auxiliary or commandeered vessels, as well as the transition of personnel to other maritime agencies. At the beginning of the war, the Bureau of Maritime Transport organized and performed the transport of a large number of reservists from Cyclades and Crete to Piraeus and also of a vast number of troops from the port of Piraeus to Epirus and Macedonia. Although all the above were successfully and rapidly accomplished, there were certain delays caused by the failure to comply with orders and by the lack of experience on the part of military personnel in embarkation and disembarkation of troops.

This authority also assisted the Piraeus Military Base (PMB) in order to perform the transport of catering supplies and military material by motor vessels as rapidly and securely as possible. However, due to the lack of experience of the military logistics officers of Piraeus Military Base, concerning the loading of various materials on waterborne vessels, material was damaged.

For that reason, it was decided that the Piraeus Naval Base should be found, under the command of a reserve captain (138), and fell under the jurisdiction of NDA-3. Indeed,

within a very short time, was achieved the proper classification of the items sent, space saving, shipment of larger quantities and the faster loading and unloading, by using appropriate personnel originating from reserve officers of the Hellenic Navy.

The Maritime Bureau provided navigation instructions to all ships to avoid collision with mines; which is indeed why it also maintained the mine barrages and waterways in optimum condition, while the minesweepers of the agency were tirelessly operating. It also rendered valuable services to HNGS and to every other department concerned, by providing information on time of departure or arrival of any ship and also the possible position of steamships in accordance with the respected plot. Hence, ships at sea were often alerted about the presence of hostile activity or appearance of hostile submarines close to their course. A semaphore station was installed in Psyttaleia in order to control ships and to regulate traffic at the barrage gates of entering and outgoing ships.

At the beginning of the war, the Office of Maritime Communications experienced difficulties and delays, due to accumulation of a significant number of reports from observations post, to reception of signals and orders acknowledgement and notably to the large number of lengthy cryptograms.

This was induced by the inexperience of the communication personnel of NDA-3, which initially consisted of reservists; the existing personnel was reinforced by staff specialized in monitoring of crews and observation posts, not only in terms of replenishment, catering and clothing supply but also of machinery and radio apparatus repairs etc. However, despite the initial difficulties, this agency readjusted in no time and achieved excellent results, along with the network of observation posts, until the end of war.

Finally, the Office of Maritime Communications ensured the installation and maintenance of observatories in various remote parts of Cyclades and Attica, Euboea and Peloponnese coastline; this agency also ensured the handling of dysfunctional and repaired communication devices, to and from the Radiotelegraphic Service of the Hellenic Navy, in order to avoid causing problems to the agencies. Lastly, few days before the war declaration, because of possible magnetic mine laying by Germans, the need for their identification became apparent. Thus, 25 observatories were established, which achieved excellent results.

Until the German invasion, NDA-3 operated seamlessly, despite the encountered difficulties. The pace of work as well as its performance was sharply eased after the continuous air raids against the port and region of Piraeus, due to the inadequate anti-aircraft defense of the installations of NDA-3 and to the damage caused by bombardments, the personnel wasn't able to work as usual.

The night of 6th to 7th April, during an air raid against the port of Piraeus, the explosion of the British ship Clan Fraser occurred, which was loaded with ammunition, resulting in causing extensive damage along the port. The installations of NDA-3 were completely destroyed and five men were slightly injured. In order to avoid the termination of this agency, its immediate relocation was mandated, to the facilities of the Hellenic Naval Academy, which was accomplished within 24 hours and remained there until the end of war.

Even after the outbreak of hostilities with Germans, the morale of the staff of NDA-3 remained high. On Maundy Thursday, April 17th, a small number of the personnel went on indefinite leave of absence, which was however revoked the following day and all of them were ordered to reinstate to their service. The morale of the staff was such that despite the unfavorable news, all were reinstated within 48 hours and remained in their posts until 26 of April; actually, many of them remained until the surrender of the agency.

- **Anti-aircraft defense (AAD)**

When Commander Christos Chatzikonstantis arrived at the AAD Service, on May 27th, it was in a mobilization mode, which was commanded by the HNGS and should be completed by 2/6/1940. During that period, the transport of material and ammunition was performed, along with the withdrawal of all those who have already served in conscripted ranks, even able seamen, telephone operators and administrators, with individual call-up orders.

The development of organized units was conducted accurately and swiftly thanks to the valuable contribution of Lieutenant-Commander D. Kiosses (Deputy Commander, Commander of Salamis Air Defense subsector), Sub-lieutenant S. Manolas and Midshipman A. Kapsokavadis. By the expected due date, all the equipment and quartering material was already transferred to the designated positions.

The developed forces of the Athens- Salamis- Naval Station area, were tactically subjected to the jurisdiction of the Commander of the Area Air Defense Command/A (CAADC/A), General Stais, and together formed the A2 unit, while those of the areas of Chalkida, Volos and Patras fell tactically under the respective NDAs and their Commanders.

The period from the mobilization until the beginning of the Greco-Italian war was of intensive efforts to achieve the following:

- The crew training under field conditions by conducting a series of day and night exercises along with respective lectures,
 - The training of reserve officers. Especially, the gun emplacements of Psyttaleia constituted a training center during both, the time of peace and Greco-Italian war, where were trained 85 reserve officers, graduates of Schools of the National Technical University of Athens,
 - The supplementation of quartering supplies,
 - The improvement of protective equipment, in cases of operations or damages,
 - The improvement of accommodation in wooden and built boxes,
 - The training of a number of men and NCOs for special posts, especially of reservists, in order to be used as cadres in case of increased needs.
 - The training of approximately 50 new listeners and stereoscopic observers; listeners were used for the manning of ten new acoustic apparatus, six of which were allocated to coastal forts, three were used for the reinforcement of the Athens-Naval Station area and one was sent to Chalkida, while the stereoscopic observers were allocated to forts, fleet and AAD.
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- **Salamis Naval Base**

The Commanding Chief of this facility was Charalambos Delagrammatikas. According to his activity report, already since the summer of 1940, measures had been adopted to ensure that the Naval Station would be never caught unprepared.

In terms of personnel, the Naval Station was significantly disadvantaged compared to other services and agencies, because although it was entrusted with a major part of the military

preparedness task, it was never supplemented with appropriate cadres; instead it continued to operate with the existing personnel since the antebellum period. At the outbreak of war, the Station was reinforced with certain reservists and NCOs.

The majority of the officers though, was originating from retired officers and NCOs, who after being recalled as officers, did not offer positive service, while the NCOs were continuously transferred to other agencies and the replacement reservists failed to meet the Naval Station's requirements.

In addition, there were no efficient specialized day-laborer technicians to fill vacancies that occurred at the workshops of the Naval Station, because they were recruited as draftees by the Army, while employed in commandeered plants of Piraeus, the work of which was increased.

Regarding the passive air defense, due to credit shortage, the Ministry of Naval Affairs had not approved the construction of underground bunkers. Therefore, by late October 1940, there were only some poor entrenchments in certain sites of the Naval Station available for the passive air defense. Because of the particularities of the ground, the most of them were filling with water from sewers, to the extent that they were rendered unusable. It therefore became necessary to use the basement of the incomplete building of the Central Naval Electric Station (CNES), as a shelter for the protection of personnel. Additionally, the basement of the depot was also used, even if there were still construction works in progress.

As these shelters were insufficient, since the beginning of war and on, the Electric Substation of the coast on the one hand and the battleship *Kilkis* on the other, the site below the deck after unloading the existing ammunition, were also used.

Despite the difficulties, Salamis Naval Station coped successfully with the circumstances of wartime. The repair of ships - as quick as possible- as well as their unhindered supply, was achieved by restless and continuous work. Some of the major repairs carried out during war were the following:

- The repair of the Greek destroyer *Vasilissa Olga*, after a collision,
- The overhaul of the Greek destroyer *Hydra*, after terrible sea conditions,
- The repair –for similar reasons- of the Greek destroyer *Spetsai*,

- The repair of rudder and sternpost of the Greek submarine *Nirefs*,
- The replacement of boiler pipes of the Greek destroyers *Panthir* and *Aetos*,
- The general inspection of the Greek submarine *Glafkos*, along with destroyers and torpedo boats and
- The serious but futile efforts expended to salvage the Greek destroyer *Vasilefs Georgios* (139).
- Radiotelegraphic Service of the Hellenic Navy (RTSHN)

The Commander-in-Chief of this Service was Kyriakos Pezopoulos, who reports that during wartime (28/10/40-27/4/41) the Service had performed the following tasks:

- Maintenance and repair of the radio-telecommunication hardware of land stations and ships, along with the telephone network and equipment.
- Completion of the radio reception center of the Hellenic Naval War and of the radio transmitter remote control. Then, both were transferred to the underground bunker of Mount Lycabettus.
- Installation of a transmitting center at Agia Paraskevi, in order to be used as a reserve in case of a potential destruction of the Votanikos Wireless Station.
- Completion of the observation posts network of Naval Defense Areas by installing various portable stations.
- For certain telecommunications, a 200 watt short-wave telephone transmitter had been studied by Captain Pezopoulos and afterwards constructed by the crew of the Service. Although it was completed, it could never be tested because of the current events, and therefore remained in the Service's workshop.
- Construction of various rectifiers and installations of stations on warships and auxiliary vessels.
- For the first time in Greece, construction of hand-held Aldis-type signal lamps (140).
- Repair and maintenance of all the vehicles of Naval Services and
- Construction and maintenance of all the batteries and signal lamps used by land stations, warships, auxiliary vessels, observation posts and vehicles.

All the above-mentioned tasks were operated by the Permanent Technical Staff of the Radiotelegraphic Service, which was supplemented with reservists and day laborer technicians, as to 20% more than its pre-war composition. Regarding the actions of this Service, the British Admiral Turk expressed to the Chief of Staff his personal gratitude for the services rendered to the British Fleet, throughout the war and especially during the Battle of Cape Matapa (141). The depots were filled with spare parts and therefore no shortages

occurred. On the contrary, in cases of emergency, material and spare parts were granted to the Army.

- **Saronic Gulf Naval Forts Command**

Captain Georgios Pagkaras was the Commanding Officer of this Command and fell under Vice-Admiral Oikonomou, which encompassed:

- 1 The Northern Aegina Fortress (NAF)
- 2 The Southern Aegina Fortress (SAF)
- 3 The Naval Fortress of Fleves islet
- 4 Three commandeered patrol cars
- 5 The Naval Hospital of Aegina
- 6 The Naval Command of Aegina.

The gun emplacements of the primary, secondary and anti-aircraft armament of Forts, the searchlights and the various means of communication were completed even before the Italian offensive and were already operational. Already installed and operational were also the fire direction systems of all Saronic Gulf Forts except that of Northern Aegina Fortress, where even though the fire direction instruments of the primary armament had already arrived from abroad, the competent technicians had not yet completed their emplacement; which actually was never completed –even by the end of war, because of the required intensive work of at least four months by specialized personnel.

Because of that, the fire direction of the primary armament was executed in the most primitive manner, while the indirect fire was practically impossible. The following exercises and the measures applied concerning the indirect fire, improved the situation as possible, however the deficiencies in necessary instruments were crucial.

As there was a training problem for the non-commissioned officers, some of whom had not conducted firing exercises for a long period, in some cases as long as twenty years, the Commander requested the Superior Authority to conduct a series of training firings. However, these were not carried out because the necessary floating means were not available.

During the war, the heavy artillery of the Saronic Fortifications was not used, nor was there any attempt at an amphibious operation. The combat action mainly involved dealing with

aerial offensives, which were infrequent during the Greco-Italian war but very frequent and intense during the Greco-German war. The NAF shot down three aircraft, and the SAF caused damage to and possibly downed one.

h) Torpedo and Mine Warfare Command (TMC)

The Commander here was the Reserve Captain Ioannis Chalikiopoulos. This agency worked feverishly and accomplished in full its mission. It armed all the vessels with torpedoes and ensured their inspection and maintenance; it also equipped warships and minelayers for mine laying and participated in these as well.

A truly characteristic case was the successful mine laying operation between Corfu and Agioi Saranta, which was led by the Commander of Torpedo and Mine Warfare Command, after the Agioi Saranta occupation by the Hellenic Army.

More specifically, under this Command the following were carried out:

- Equipped the ships with depth charges and the respective rack systems.
- Collected or destroyed floating mines in various areas.
- Retrieved, under severe war conditions, the minefield of Preveza, during the final days of the German offensives; it retrieved the minefield of Kavalliani, as well as a part of the minefield between Moni islet and Methana.
- Organized rapidly the Magnetic Mine Marking and Disarming Service, during the German invasion.
- Arranged the maintenance and improvement of the laid barrages of approximately 18 km overall length.
- Installed a barrier at the entrance of Piraeus port within 24 hours and with very makeshift means; an accomplishment that was congratulated by Admiral Turk.

On the eve of the Hellenic Fleet departure towards Alexandria, the Commander of Torpedo and Mine Warfare Command managed to gather the majority of the personnel at the Palaskas crew center in order to proceed with the manning of the Hellenic Fleet ships.

i) Naval Command of Crete (NDA-2)

Although the operation of a Naval Command on the island of Crete was scheduled, still there was no such preparation performed during peacetime, and there were no defensive constructions on the island. Only a surveillance network had been installed with its information center located in Chania and Heraklion.

With the declaration of the Greco-Italian war, Reserve Rear-Admiral Pelias Ioannidis was sent to Crete and settled as independent Naval Commander in Chalepa, next to Chania, along with only one reserve NCO and two junior operators. The Commander's duties were mainly the surveillance of military transport and the safeguard of navigation throughout Cretan Sea and in the vicinity; also, all naval agencies of the island were under his supervision, namely the Port Office, lighthouses and the radio of Chania, as well as the operation network.

However, he was not provided any warships or auxiliary vessels. This degradation is explained by the fact that the entire defense of the island had been entrusted to the English, who landed a small military force and launched the installation of coastal and anti-aircraft artillery, mainly at Souda Bay, which was intended to become their base of operations. They also laid a barrage in the area and started to construct airports in Maleme and Heraklion. The activity of this Naval Command was limited only on coordinating the Greek and British operations.

The Naval Command of Crete seized the control of the local maritime transport and of that connecting with mainland of Greece, while also handled the clearance of mines that were carried along to Crete from the minefields of northern African coasts.

From the early days of November 1940, the enemy started bombing the island and the air-raids were a daily occurrence involving multiple casualties and damages. Many English vessels were also hit, such as the cruiser *Glasgow*. On 22/3/1941, a severe air-raid was performed in the South of Crete, against a convoy escorted by the Greek destroyers *V. Georgios* and *Kountouriotis*.

The Greek destroyers requested from the Naval Command of Crete the immediate dispatch of aircrafts and a tugboat (142). Upon the initiative of the naval Commander of Crete, the English initially dispatched only one aircraft and then after an additional request, dispatched another one declaring that there was no more availability.

After the advance of the German troops towards Greek mainland, the air-raids against the bases of Souda and Heraklion became much more frequent. At Souda Bay, were located many Greek and English merchant vessels. The HNGS had been repeatedly requested by the N. Commander of Crete to order the Greek vessels to flee to Alexandria, but the order came too late and did not concern all of them.

The departure of the Greek warships towards Alexandria can be characterized eventful (143). The Minister of Naval Affairs, Admiral Sakellariou, stayed 2-3 days in Crete and then headed to Alexandria. Only the Greek destroyers *Leon* and *Sfendoni* remained at NDA-2, along with their crews. The N. Commander of Crete was ordered to communicate, regarding naval issues, with the Prime Minister, who was still remaining in Crete.

A week before the beginning of the Battle of Crete, the headquarters were bombarded; therefore the Commander was staying there only during daytime, whereas he was staying in the village of Fourni overnight, 15 km. from Chania. The German offensive was launched on 20/5/41 in the morning, with their transport aircrafts dropping paratroopers over various locations of Crete (Souda Bay, Rethymno, Heraklion etc.), the landing of which was extremely fast.

All the telegraphic and telephone communications were severed. It was the same day when the Maleme Airfield was conquered and was therefore used as the base of operations for the occupation of the rest of the island. The N. Commander was stranded at the village of Fourni and due to continuous bombarding of this area he escaped to a nearby cave along with his family and other citizens, where he was arrested by Germans. From that point began his personal venture, including imprisonments and interrogations on the island of Crete and Athens. Eventually, he was released on 27 September.

d) Higher Northwestern Aegean Naval Command (HN/WANC) and Naval Defense Area of Euboea (NDA-4)

During the first days of war, operated the Higher Naval Command of the Northwestern Aegean, under which fell the N. Command of Thermaic Gulf (NCTH) and NDA-4, the latter based in the village of Oreoi, which was initially responsible for the facilitation of the navigation at the Trikeri barrage. The N. Commands of Volos, Chalkida, Skyros, the

fortification of the North Euboean Gulf, all the observatories from Mount Olympus to Skyros and the 11th Maritime Squadron of Fairey biplanes – based at Valtoudi cove-, all fell under the jurisdiction of NDA-4.

The Higher Northwestern Aegean Naval Command was entrusted to Captain Christoforos Konialis, who as the Superintendent of Naval Schools (SNS) had completed the implementation of the Hellenic Navy Personnel Mobilization Plan. The objective of this service was the coordination of the N. Command of Thermaic Gulf and NDA-4, of the transports of all kinds from Euripus Strait to Volos and Thessaloniki, along with the convoy formation towards Eastern Macedonia, Thrace and Eastern Aegean islands. Because of the increasing volume of transport and the appearance of hostile submarines, this N. Command was reinforced since 21/1/41, with the torpedo boats Niki and Aspis, in order to ensure secure transportation within N. Aegean and Sporades islands.

During the Greco-Italian war, there were no noteworthy hostilities within the area of NDA-4, while the air-raids against Volos were rare. Also, no offensives from surface vessels were materialized, while the hostile submarines hit two or three convoys and individual warships, however without success. Nevertheless, small high-speed vessels of NDA-4 were continuously patrolling, mainly the region of Northern Sporades, while biplanes of the 11th Squadron, equipped with depth bombs, were monitoring the area, as an additional protection to any large convoys in transit. The night passages of the merchant ships were performed also unescorted.

In the direction of Trikeri-Thessaloniki there was a swept path, which followed the west coast of Thermaic Gulf and the half of it was cleared from mines on daily basis by the minesweepers of the N. Command of Thermaic Gulf and the other half by NDA-4. The navigation service at the North Euboean Gulf was carried out smoothly by NDA-4 with the aid of the North Euboan fort.

During the second phase of war, the Commander appeared particularly active, mostly during crucial times, when secret orders had to be implemented, concerning the Army's withdrawal and the transfer or destruction of material, while the Germans advanced rapidly towards Thessaloniki after the collapse of the Greek front.

When, on the morning of 6 April 1941, the signal of the HNGS was received, concerning the outbreak of war with Germany, apart from various patrol vessels, minesweepers and other auxiliary vessels already being under the orders of this N. Command, five warships were also available in the area under the direct orders of the Commander (*Aetos, Sfendoni, Niki, Doris, Alkyone*), as well as other merchant vessels. Already since early March, the Commander had been informed by the Prime Minister of Greece, Alexandros Koryzis, that in case of hostile invasion from the North and descent towards the South, he had to serve the Military Authorities with all his powers and to maintain the active means of the N. Command of Thermaic Gulf, until the very last moment. Afterwards, he ought to destroy any material that could not be transported, as well as piers, docks and loading equipment of Thessaloniki Port, to remove any waterborne means which could not be destroyed and after receiving the transportable armament –as well as all the personnel- to sail South, notifying the HNGS about their specific site of arrival.

Concerning the Hellenic Army's withdrawal from Eastern Macedonia and Thrace and any transport of military units from these regions, the MARITIME TRANSPORT PLAN was drawn up, according to which anchored merchant vessels, troop carriers and diesel-powered crafts would be available to Military Authorities for immediate loading of military staff and equipment, all along the coastal area from Alexandroupoli to Thessaloniki.

On April 6, all the ships were in their position, fully equipped and ready to sail. There were cargo or steam ships in Alexandroupolis (1), Amphipolis (2), Ammouliani (2) and Thessaloniki (7); namely 12 steamships of total capacity of 20.000 men and also 87 diesel-powered crafts (144) of approximately 6.000. At 16:20 of 8 April, the N. Commander of Thermaic Gulf was ordered to enforce the secret order of the Prime Minister and its overall implementation- application is considered successful. Especially the abandonment of Megalo Emvolo (Karaburnu) Fort and the complete destruction of the material which could not be transported were performed with accuracy and as planned.

Thanks to the orderliness and the admirable composure demonstrated by the crew, the loading of two searchlights and an aircraft acoustic locator was achieved, despite their high weight and the non-existent loading equipment. In addition, three quick firing guns of 75mm with their ammunition were loaded, although their transfer was not foreseen and instead their destruction had been decided. Surely, those people who strived for the transport of the

Country's war material, as well as their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Ioannis Toumbas (145), whose prudent administration conferred superhuman strength to the crew, all deserve an honorable mention as a part of our History.

After the arrival at the village of Oreoi, the Commander received an order from HNGS, according to which the personnel of the N. Command of Thermaic Gulf should be transported to the Superior Command of Naval Schools and all the equipment to Salamis Naval Station, except two 37mm A/A guns, which were placed in Chalkida. Additionally, as regards the Naval Officers, he was ordered to keep only those he needed, and to order the rest of them to report at the Ministry of Naval Affairs.

On April 12, the Commander was ordered by the Prime Minister of Greece and Minister of Naval Affairs, Alexandros Koryzis, the following:

- a) To let the personnel to depart on regular leave and only a small number of civilian employees to remain for the guarding of buildings, facilities and equipment
- b) To destroy forts and A/A units, as well as armament and ammunition, of which the transport was impossible and
- c) To destroy and disable all the war material in deposition.

D. (σσ. 488-499)

The British were very satisfied with the action of the Greek minesweepers, and asked the Ministry of Naval Affairs to use a number of seamen to man the observatories, in order to detect naval mines from the enemy's aircrafts. A similar service was established under the first Greek Mine Warfare Command, called MAMN (Magnetic and Acoustic Mine Neutralization).

On November 10, the submarine *Glafrkos* during a patrol in the area of Chania fired two torpedoes against a loaded merchant ship of 3,000 tons, and one of them reached the target. After the successful offensive, it continued to patrol north of Chania and Souda between November 12 and 14. Yet, frequent severe damages forced it to flee to Malta. During the voyage, the submarine's motor failed because of the bad weather, causing waves to enter

the vessel from the conning tower. As a result, the Commanding Officer was forced to cancel an offensive against an Italian convoy.

At the end of November and the beginning of December, the Greek submarines *Triton* and *Nirefs* carried out missions approaching the southern coasts of Crete in order to pick up and transport British and Greeks, who were persecuted by the German authorities. Three such missions were completed successfully. Food and medicine were given to hidden Greeks and British, while a total of 40 people were picked up from Crete, including 10 officers and 3 women. More missions could not be carried out because with every such mission a Greek submarine would be taken away from patrols, which were already decreased because of frequent damages to the Greek submarines.

At the end of December in 1941, the British launched an offensive against the German and Italian powers in Libya. The Fleet Commander and the Minister of Naval Affairs requested from the British, the Greek ships to be more active on missions other than escorts. The British, then, requested a Greek destroyer to patrol east of Tobruk. The destroyers *Panthir*, *Ierax*, *Niki* and *Aspis* took over the patrolling of the Bardia-Sollum area with Marsa Matruh as the base of operations. The Greek ships, however, were in a very bad condition. The *Panthir* and *Niki* could not stay there for more than four days because of the engine's bad condition. They were replaced by *Ierax* and *Aspis*, which took over the patrolling of Sollum. These missions stopped on December 17, because the advance of the British Army made them redundant.

However, the loss of Lieutenant Nikolaos Merlin was an event that left a mark on December as well. Merlin was the executive officer of the Greek submarine *Glafkos*, which would remain in Malta for a long time in order to be repaired. That is why he asked to serve on a British submarine in order to enrich his knowledge. He boarded the big British submarine *Perseus*, which set sail from Malta in November 26, to patrol outside of Taranto and the Ionian Sea. He was expected to return on December 20, but the submarine never arrived. It had hit a mine.

At the beginning of 1942, the Greek Fleet had old and worn out ships. Yet, they managed to engage in military action and mostly remain alive. Many times, even just remaining alive is in itself an important victory. In 1942, the Greek Fleet started renovations by acquiring

new ships, with which they participated more actively in the Allied efforts, while officers and personnel came together to operate new technological systems. Having rebuilt itself, the Hellenic Navy wrote a new chapter in the midst of a raging war. At the same time, the personnel of the Fleet were increased in order to man the new naval units. Men who left Greece and also volunteers were presented and conscripted.

On March 20, 1942, the enlistment of ten age groups of Greeks from Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and Sudan began. The mobilisation of Greeks of Great Britain started as well, who would serve as crew members mainly on merchant ships. However, this increase of men brought some problems of mutinies against the Leadership. Especially in the crews of merchant ships, there were people with ideas and political views, which were largely incompatible with the spirit and the needs of the war.

At the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, it was decided to provide the Hellenic Navy with four Hunt-class destroyers, which were named *Pindos*, *Adrias*, *Miaoulis*, and *Kanaris* (145). The British also promised to provide one or two submarines (146), two more destroyers and four corvettes. In 1942, due to a Greek Government reshuffle, Rear Admiral Kavvadias took over as the Deputy Minister of Naval Affairs, while Rear Admiral Sakellariou took over as the Fleet Commander.

After its repairs and retrofits, the destroyer *V. Olga* with Commanding Officer I. Vlachopoulos started its great action by conducting anti-submarine operations in the area of Trincomalee and Colombo, escorting two big American steamships of 25,000 tons to Mumbai, participating in British combined exercises with submarines, destroyers and aircrafts in Alexandria, and rescuing the crew of a downed British aircraft.

On March 25, the destroyer *V. Olga* and the British destroyer *Jaguar* escorted the oil tanker *Slavol* from Alexandria to Marsa Matruh. On the evening of the same day, the Greek destroyer blew up a floating mine and then dropped 20 depth charges against a located submarine. However, the submarine managed to torpedo the *Jaguar*. The *V. Olga* rescued the survivors and proceeded to escort the oil tanker alone. Yet, the oil tanker was torpedoed and sunk the next morning. The Greek destroyer rescued the survivors and dropped 10 depth charges, but without any confirmed results.

Apart from escorts, the *V. Olga* was also ordered to leave the convoy on April 7, and sail to a designated area in order to rescue the crew of the British hospital ship *Somersetshire*, which had been torpedoed. Eventually, the damaged ship managed to reach Alexandria on its own, but the Greek destroyer picked up the hospital personnel and transported them to Marsa Matruh. The destroyer, then, participated in escorts in the area of Alexandria-Tobruk-Port Said. On April 20, while escorting a British oil tanker from Port Said to Alexandria, it was hit unsuccessfully by two enemy torpedo bombers from a height of 100 meters and a distance of 800-1,000 meters. At the end of April, it carried out anti-submarine operations in the area of Alexandria.

After its repairs and retrofits by early 1942, the destroyer *Aetos* escorted two transport ships full of troops from Colombo to Cochin. On March 14, the Greek destroyer detected an enemy submarine and made three consecutive offensives with depth charges, but without any confirmed results. On April 4, the destroyer returned in Alexandria, where it remained in the shipyard for minor repairs until about mid-May.

At the beginning of 1942, the Greek submarines were very badly maintained. The submarine *Glaŕkos* was severely damaged during the terrible German aerial bombardments in Malta. The Greek submarine was there for repairs, when on February 27, 1942, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander V. Arslanoglou and Sub Lieutenant I. Kostakos, who were on the wharfs of the dockyard outside the shelter, lost their lives during the bombardment.

As a result, the slightly injured executive officer, Lieutenant Daniolos took over as the Commanding Officer of the submarine. Unfortunately, a great number of British ships were lost due to the frequent bombardments. By April 4, the submarine *Glaŕkos* was repaired, and the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Daniolos was waiting for the test results of the motors in order to sail as soon as possible. However, on that day at around 11:30 am, German aircrafts dropped bombs against the Greek submarine. Three of them hit the submarine causing it to sink within two minutes. There were no casualties as the personnel were ordered to withdraw to the nearby shelter after the first airstrike.

By the end of April in 1942, according to a report by the Commander of the Hellenic Submarines Command, Captain Antonopoulos (147), the Greek submarines carried out a total of 14 war patrols and missions lasting 171 days, 34 daily exercises at sea, and they

travelled a total of 21,803 miles and were for 4,621 hours at sea. The Greek submarines fired 5 torpedoes and 17 deck gun shots, attacked one cargo steamship of 3,000 tons and two sailing ships of 40 tons. Captain Antonopoulos emphasized in his report the bad condition of the old ships.

Moreover, there were a lot of mutinies that took place during that period. For example, there was one on the battleship *G. Averof* in Mumbai and one on Chatham in Great Britain by the conscripted crews, who were about to receive the new ships. The first one started on May 13, when the seamen demanded the release of a seaman who was assaulted by the Commanding Officer, Captain Petropoulos (148). It was reported that the cause of the second one was the fact that the majority of the seamen in the Merchant Navy were driven by specific political ideas (149).

On June 1942, the German General Erwin Rommel launched his great offensive and managed to reach the line of El-Alamein. As a result, the British Fleet started to evacuate Alexandria, and on June 27-28, the big units of the British Fleet withdrew from the city. After an order of the Greek Ministry of Naval Affairs, women, husbands, patients, nurses, and prisoners from the Naval Prison with the policemen in charge, boarded the ships Ionia and Corinthia in order to evacuate Alexandria.

On June 29, the Greek ships sailed to the East escorted by a lot of submarines and destroyers. On June 30, the rest of the Greek warships were also ordered by the Greek Fleet Commander to sail from Alexandria to Port Said. These were the last of all the warships to leave the city on the evening of that day. Only the Greek minesweepers remained in the city in order to keep the access to the port of Alexandria safe from the mines dropped by the German aircrafts.

The withdrawal of the Greek Fleet was done successfully despite the nervousness that prevails in similar cases. The Fleet Headquarters were temporarily established in Ismailia (150) and later in mid-September were transferred to Port Said. The Hellenic Navy needed to be reshaped for the second time in less than two years. The Command was divided into three sections: one in Syria based in Haifa and later in Beirut, another one in Port Said and the third one in Suez. The Hellenic Submarines Command was established in Syria together with the British Submarines Command. All the ships that could offer military service were

gathered in Port Said. Many convoys, in which the Greek warships participated, started from Port Said. This central position and the ability to conduct quick repairs made Port Said the ideal main base for the Fleet. The destroyers *Spetsai* and *Ierax* finished their repairs with the intensive work of the crew from the repair ship *Hephaestus* and arrived in Port Said on June 12. The *Hephaestus* and *Georgios Averof* arrived in Port Said as well.

The Fleet Commander gathered all the ships that could not offer military service in Suez. A diverse crowd of patients, prisoners and trainees was gathered on the ships *Ionia* and *Hephaestus*. And that is why the creation of a special naval camp was needed. Finally, around mid-August, it was decided to provide a camp near The Great Bitter Lake. However, it was not accommodating, and a bigger one was created, which was named HMS *Elli*. The camp was housing the Naval Academies (151) and the Transitional Service.

Before the evacuation of the city, the submarine *Papanikolis*, with Commanding Officer, Commander Spanidis, completed its repairs and sailed on June 6, from Alexandria to the west coastline of the Aegean Sea and Crete for a war patrol. On June 11, the submarine rammed a loaded sailing ship of 15 tons near Cape Maleas, while the next day in Cape Kamili two more loaded sailing ships of 30 and 15 tons were sunk by deck gun shots. On the same day, a German sailing boat full of 70 tons of oil was rammed and sunk at the same position. At the end of that day, one more sailing ship of 30 tons with a load of salt was sunk near Cape Maleas.

On June 14, the Greek submarine sailed from Cape Matapan to Porto Kagio, where a sailing ship of 70 tons was anchored. The sailing ship was commandeered by Sub Lieutenant Troupakis, who had previously reached the enemy base with a dinghy accompanied by a reconnaissance team. After commandeering the sailing ship, he moved it away from the coast, where it was sunk by the Greek submarine. Finally, on the night of June 15-16, the submarine *Papanikolis* dropped off agents and war materiel in Crete, and picked up 15 New Zealanders. On June 20, it arrived in Alexandria after a total voyage of 1,255 miles and 340 hours.

The submarine *Triton*, with Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Kontogiannis, sailed on June 6, to its initial destination Crete, where it dropped off a team of commandos and about 1.5 tons of war materiel. Then, it took over the patrolling of the area of Cyclades. In the area of

Thera, it sank a sailing ship, which was transporting load to Piraeus for the black market. The submarine rescued 5 Greek and 3 Italian soldiers.

On June 13 at 2 pm, the Greek submarine located a sailing ship in the area of Cape Kafireas. The submarine *Triton* fired against it repeatedly with the deck gun, but it could not sink it. At the same time, another sailing ship appeared and the Greek submarine started firing towards it. However, the submarine's deck gun elevation mechanism was damaged, forcing it to ram the first sailing ship. The submarine, then, started to get hit by land. The *Triton* tried to ram the second sailing ship, which was hit and abandoned by its crew but not yet sunk.

Eventually, the submarine had to move away because of the shots by land. It was reported by a rescued person from the first sailing ship that it was 270 tons with a load of 210 tons of coal and was sailing from Kymi to Piraeus in order to deliver the load to the Germans. The second sailing ship was 150 tons without load.

The Greek fleet was supplied with new ships. Firstly, two new minesweepers were received: the *Alkanet*, which took over the minesweeping in the area of Beirut and later of Famagusta in Cyprus, and the *Lykos*, which entered service in mid-September. The first corvette that was granted to the Hellenic Navy was *Peony*, which raised the Greek flag on June 24, and was renamed *Sachtouris*. Lieutenant Commander Fifas took over as the Commanding Officer.

The first mission of the Greek corvette was the towing of the destroyer *V. Olga* during the evacuation of Alexandria. From June until September 1942, it carried out a number of escorts, which included the cities of Beirut, Port Said, Haifa, Famagusta, Mersin and Alexandretta. It travelled a total of 13,966 miles without the slightest problem. On June 3, the destroyer *Pindos* raised the Greek flag in Newcastle and Commander Kiris took over as the Commanding Officer. The ship took part in exercises with destroyers and submarines, and also in escorts until its arrival in Suez at the end of October in 1942.

At the beginning of August, there was no threat against Alexandria anymore and the British Fleet was transferred there again. Both the Fleet Commander and the Deputy Minister of Naval Affairs did not want to relocate to Alexandria because they thought that the beauty

and the luxury of the city would have a negative effect to the crews' discipline. Eventually, the Ministry of Naval Affairs, the minesweepers flotilla, the Navy officer candidate schools, some warehouses and the hospital, remained based in Alexandria.

In August, the old Greek destroyers carried out anti-submarine operations, and mainly escorts in the area of Port Said, Beirut, Haifa, Cyprus and more, but they were often facing damages. Notably, the destroyer *Aetos* was operating with one engine not being able to work in reverse, while *Spetsai* had only two working boilers after failing to repair the third one (152).

On July 20, the destroyer *Adrias* raised the Greek flag with Commanding Officer, Commander I. Toumpas. However, as it was sailing to receive the Commanding Officer, an unfortunate grounding forced the Greek destroyer to be repaired until November 29, 1942. Then, it set sail in order to participate in training in the British naval base Scapa Flow until the end of December, 1942. The other *Hunt-class* destroyer *Kanaris*, with Commanding Officer, Captain I. Vlachopoulos, raised the Greek flag on July 28, and participated in training and exercises until September 16. Then, it arrived in Liverpool for the cleaning of its boilers.

On September 30, the destroyer started its long journey around Africa participating in escorts to join the Greek Fleet. The first mission of the Greek destroyer during its voyage was the escort of 8 British ships from Liverpool to Londonderry.

On July 24, the submarine *Papanikolis* with Commanding Officer, Commander Spanidis, sailed from Haifa to Crete, where it dropped off war materiel and commandos, and picked up 24 Greeks and 1 British officer. The operation had a lot of difficulties because of the weather conditions and the inability to communicate with those on land. The attempt to pick up a second team in another part of the island was cancelled because the communication was impossible. Also, tents and floodlights made it clear that the enemy was present in that area.

From August 31 until September 15, the Greek submarine carried out its second patrol and it dropped off commandos and war materiel to Rhodes. During the patrol, the submarine

faced a number of damages, which forced it to sail to Suez in order to be repaired by the crew of the repair ship *Hephaestus*.

On the evening of July 9, the submarine *Nirefs* with Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Rallis, sailed from Haifa in order to patrol. The personnel did very well despite the frequent damages to the submarine. The left engine stalled on the third day, and the right one a little later. The submarine was forced to sail near Cyprus with its electric motors, when at the same time there was damage at the gyrocompass.

On July 15, the engines were repaired and the submarine passed through the Rhodes-Karpathos strait. At around 10 am, the *Nirefs* located four sailing ships four miles north of Karpathos. The Greek submarine made an offensive sinking the biggest three of them. The Commanding Officer of the submarine let the 44 surviving members of the crew board the fourth sailing ship, which he set free. He took the owner of the sailing ships, his son and one engineer on the Greek submarine. They gave him important information about the fortification of the Dodecanese Islands and the power of the guards.

On July 19, at 2:25 pm, the *Nirefs* located an enemy ship of 6,000-7,000 tons. The Greek submarine fired 4 torpedoes from a distance of 2,300 meters, and at least one of them reached the target as they heard an explosion.

On July 20, in the area of Kea-Makronisos, the submarine encountered an average displacement cargo ship escorted by a destroyer of 1,500 tons, within 5 miles distance. The offensive conditions were ideal, but a new damage due to short circuit cancelled the offensive.

ΕΠΙΛΟΓΟΣ – ΣΧΟΛΙΑ

Η εργασία είναι ενοποιημένη παρουσίαση τεσσάρων (4) μεταφρασμάτων από εκτενή αποσπάσματα του βιβλίου «ΜΕΘ’ ΟΡΜΗΣ ΑΚΑΘΕΚΤΟΥ: Επίτομη Ιστορία του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού 1821-1945» του Παναγιώτη Γέροντα, με χρονολογική σειρά :

- Α. σσ. 245-287: Πρόκειται για παρουσίαση της συμμετοχικής δραστηριότητας του τότε Ελληνικού Κράτους στα πολιτικά-κοινωνικά γεγονότα των αρχών του 20^{ου} αιώνα, λ.χ. συνδρομή κατά της Οκτωβριανής Επανάστασης, σε στρατιωτικό επίπεδο, καθώς και της πολιτικής κατάστασης στην Ελλάδα, που ως συνθήκες θα οδηγήσουν στην ανάγκη θεσμοθέτησης, ανάπτυξης και ενίσχυσης του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού ως σώματος στρατού (Σχολή Ναυτικών Δοκίμων, αγορά σκαφών).

- Β. σσ. 356-388 : Αναφέρεται στη δημιουργία του Σώματος την περίοδο του Μεσοπολέμου.

- Γ. σσ. 389-414 : Παρουσιάζεται η ίδρυση και οργάνωση της Σχολής Ναυτικών Δοκίμων, η στελέχωση με εκπαιδευτικό προσωπικό, δίνονται γενικές πληροφορίες για το Πρόγραμμα Σπουδών καθώς και η προετοιμασία για τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο

- Δ. σσ. 488-499 : Το Πολεμικό Ναυτικό κατά τον Β΄ Π.Π.

Σε όλα τα αποσπάσματα, κυριαρχούν τόσο η εσωτερική πολιτική και τα πολιτικά γεγονότα που καθόρισαν την εξέλιξή του, σε οικονομικό και πολιτικό επίπεδο αλλά και η στάση των συμμαχικών κρατών/δυνάμεων σε καιρό Ειρήνης μα και σε καιρό πολέμου.

Πέραν της κειμενικής προσέγγισης του πρωτοτύπου και των μεταφραστικών δυσκολιών, αξίζει να προσθέσουμε ότι το βιβλίο δίνει ανάγλυφη εικόνα της τότε κατάστασης στη χώρα και οδηγεί σε συμπεράσματα ή συλλογισμούς εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέροντες σχετικά με την οργάνωση του Κράτους, την αντίληψη περί Άμυνας της χώρας, την εξωτερική πολιτική της διαχρονικά, τις στάσεις των πολιτικών προσώπων.

Και επειδή, η μεταφραστική εργασία απαιτεί πολυεπίπεδες και κριτικές δεξιότητες, για κατανόηση του Λ(λ)όγου και του πολιτισμού, της κουλτούρας που φέρει κάθε γλωσσικός κώδικας, κυρίως του κειμένου-πηγή, το βιβλίο έχει εξαιρετικό ενδιαφέρον.

Οι υποσημειώσεις που, στο πρωτότυπο, βρίσκονται στο σώμα του κειμένου, στην εργασία παρατίθενται σε παράρτημα. Στο μετάφρασμα, όπου υπάρχει αριθμός εντός παρένθεσης αντιστοιχεί στη σημείωσή του στο τέλος.

Σε Παράρτημα, βρίσκονται και οι φωτογραφίες του πρωτοτύπου με τις λεζάντες τους.

Τα κείμενα

1. Το πρωτότυπο

Το κείμενο, καίτοι εστιασμένο στο Πολεμικό Ναυτικό, είναι πυκνό σε ποικίλες πληροφορίες, ιστορικές, στρατιωτικές/ναυτικές, πολιτικές. Αφηγηματικό, χαρακτηρίζεται ως ιστορικό, πλούσιο σε στρατιωτική ορολογία, με λόγια απόχρωση.

Χρησιμοποιείται πολυτονικό σύστημα, το οποίο δεν δυσκολεύει την κατανόηση. Το κείμενο, εν γένει, πληροί τις αρχές κειμενικότητας (de Beaugrande / Dressler, 1972). Η γλώσσα είναι η κοινή.

Τα γραμματικά φαινόμενα είναι εκείνα που ίσχυαν τον περασμένο αιώνα ούτε, όμως, αυτά δημιουργούν πρόβλημα. Η σύνταξη σαρκώνει τις πληροφορίες και τα μηνύματα κι έτσι ο στόχος του συγγραφέα (συνοχή και συνεκτικότητα) (να γνωστοποιήσει, να ενημερώσει-πληροφοριακότητα) επιτυγχάνεται (αποδεκτότητα).

Επίσης, θέτει τις συνθήκες της χρονικής περιόδου (καταστασιακότητα) με την βοήθεια του φωτογραφικού υλικού (διακειμενικότητα). Αυτό, περιορίζει σημαντικά τον βαθμό δυσκολίας της μεταφραστικής διαδικασίας.

Το βιβλίο, δημοφιλές, σε όλους τους απόφοιτους της Σχολής Ναυτικών Δοκίμων και όχι μόνον, είναι σαφές ως προς τον ιδεολογικό του προσανατολισμό, πέρα από την φιλοπατρία. Ο συγγραφέας δεν αρκείται στην παράθεση πληροφοριών, ονομάτων. Επιδιώκει να γίνει κατανοητή η πορεία του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού από τα πρώτα στάδια μέχρι τις ημέρες του.

Παραθέτει νόμους, ημερομηνίες, τόπους, δρώντες και πρωταγωνιστές στην πολιτική σκηνή, κρίνει/σχολιάζει συμπεριφορές, στάσεις, απόψεις. Γεμάτο υποσημειώσεις και φωτογραφίες.

Επιθυμεί να ενημερώσει και να φωτίσει ευρύτερο κοινό που ενδιαφέρεται για την πολιτική και αμυντική πορεία της χώρας μέσα στους δύο (2) τελευταίους αιώνες.

Το κείμενο μπορεί να χαρακτηριστεί πληροφοριακό (*informative*) και εκφραστικό (*expressive*) (Reiss,2000) .

Η μεταφράστρια/Ο μεταφραστής, ως αναγνώστρια/ης, αρχικά, αυτό το νιώθει, ανεξάρτητα αν συμφωνεί ή διαφωνεί. Αναπτύσσεται, λοιπόν, σχέση επικοινωνίας μεταξύ των δύο. Προσεγγίζονται. Αυτή την αίσθηση καλούμαστε, μεταξύ άλλων, να μεταφέρουμε στο αλλόγλωσσο κείμενο.

2. Το μετάφρασμα – Η διαδικασία της μετάφρασης

Το κείμενο-πηγή, βατό στην κατανόησή του, βρίθει όρων αρκετοί εκ των οποίων δεν απαντώνται συγκεντρωμένοι σε λεξικά. Οι απαντήσεις ποικίλουν : η δημιουργία και η μικρή ηλικία του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού και της Σχολής Ναυτικών Δοκίμων, οι ταχείες εξελίξεις και στο ίδιο το Σώμα όσο και στα μέσα του (σκάφη, εξοπλισμός, στελέχη) δεν έχουν επιτρέψει τη σχετική έρευνα, που, όμως θα είχε εξαιρετική σημασία και θα βοηθούσε ερευνητές, μελετητές όχι μόνον πανεπιστημιακών τμημάτων αλλά και το ίδιο το Π.Ν.

Πέραν των όρων, το βιβλίο διατρέχει χρονικές περιόδους με σημαντικές ενδο- και εξω- πολιτισμικές διαφορές ενώ υπάρχουν όροι που αναφέρονται στις απαρχές του οργάνωσης του Σώματος. Εδώ, ελήφθη σοβαρά υπόψη ο Newmark (1988) στην προσέγγιση και απόδοση πολιτισμικών στοιχείων, πολιτικής και διοικητικής/στρατιωτικής οργάνωσης, ιστορικών όρων.

Έτσι :

- το τοπωνύμιο “Άγιοι Σαράντα” μεταγράφηκε στην Αγγλική και σε παρένθεση μπήκε η αλβανική ονομασία του Sarandë
- το Λαϊκό Κόμμα : μεταγράφηκε στα Αγγλικά και σε παρένθεση δόθηκε η αγγλική μετάφραση(People’s Party)

- το Λιμενικό : δόθηκε ως Harbor Crops ή Port Authority και όχι ως Coast Guard επειδή στο κείμενο αναφέρεται σε εκείνη την χρονική περίοδο που δεν υπήρχε το Σώμα της Ακτοφυλακής.

- Τα αρκτικόλεξα γράφτηκαν σύμφωνα με την αγγλική μετάφραση πλην της ΠΥΡΚΑΛ που μεταφράστηκε η ελληνική ανάπτυξή του. Στους στρατιωτικούς όρους τα ελληνικά αντικαταστάθηκαν με αγγλικά, π.χ. ΑΔΝΑ - Άνωτέρα Διοίκησης Ναυτικής Αεροπορίας : Naval Aviation High Command (NAHC)

- Σε περιπτώσεις που τα λεξικά δεν είχαν λύση, όπως με τον *Οίκου του Ναύτου*, υπήρξε επικοινωνία με τον ίδιο τον οργανισμό για σχετική διερεύνηση (τι χρησιμοποιούν σε αλληλογραφία εξωτερικού κ.οκ.). Τέλος, ακολουθήσαμε την τακτική τους, δηλαδή μεταγραφή στα αγγλικά. Για να διατηρηθεί η πληροφοριακότητα, κατά το δυνατόν και στο μετάφρασμα, το αποδώσαμε με την μεγαλύτερη εγγύτητα : Seaman' s House (*Oikos Nautou*)

- τα ονόματα των πλοίων μεταγράφηκαν στα Αγγλικά, σύμφωνα με τον τρόπο του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού

- σε κάθε περίπτωση που υπήρχαν αμφιβολίες ή έλλειψη στοιχείων ανατρέχαμε στην επίσημη ιστοσελίδα, ελληνική και αγγλική, των εξεταζόμενων (Σχολή Ναυτικών Δοκίμων, Λιμενικό κ.ο.κ.)

- για το “ιδιώνυμον” προτιμήθηκε υποσημείωση μέσα στο κείμενο για την ομαλή παρακολούθηση του κειμένου επειδή θεωρήθηκε σημαντική πληροφορία για την κατανόηση της πολιτικής στάσης ανθρώπων που καθόρισαν τη ζωή της χώρας πέρα από την εποχή τους.

- Στην περίπτωση του ΚΚΕ, το ακρωνύμιο παρέμεινε με απόδοση της ανάπτυξης στα Αγγλικά μιάς και τα σημεία είναι αναγνωρίσιμα στη γλώσσα άφιξης.

Σε ό, τι αφορά, βαθμούς αξιωματικών, πέραν του πλήθους, η δηλωτική ισοδυναμία στην αγγλική (Κελάνδριας, 2015) διευκόλυνε τη μεταφραστική πράξη.

Προτιμήθηκε η Αγγλική και όχι η Αμερικάνικη διότι το Ελληνικό Πολεμικό Ναυτικό συστήθηκε και οργανώθηκε υπό βρετανική καθοδήγηση.

Τα κύρια ονόματα μεταγράφηκαν στην Αγγλική.

Η διαφορετική γραμματοσυντακτική δομή της γλώσσας-προέλευσης από τη γλώσσα-άφιξης οδήγησε, αναπόφευκτα, σε εφαρμογή της “μετάταξης” δηλαδή την μετατροπή ουσιαστικού σε ρήμα κατά το πέρασμα από τον ένα κώδικα στον άλλο.

Η εξεύρεση λέξεων ή η εφεύρεση συνταγμάτων μοιάζει με παιχνίδι που απαιτεί οξυδέρκεια, συνδυαστικότητα και, κυρίως, αντίληψη και γνώσεις όχι μόνον για το θέμα που πραγματεύεται το κείμενο-πηγή αλλά και το πολιτισμικό περιβάλλον στο οποίο αναπτύσσεται. Αν δεν κατανοηθεί το περικειμενικό και διακειμενικό περιβάλλον προέλευσης πώς θα μπορέσει να φτάσει στο μετάφρασμα;

Αυτό υποστηρίζει και η Nord αποκαλώντας το “λειτουργισμό” και μιλώντας για τη θεωρία του Σκοπού (Skopostheorie) (Nord, 2014).

Οι Vermeer (1989) και Nord (2014) πρεσβεύουν ότι το κείμενο-στόχος πρέπει να παραδίδεται κατ’ εικόνα του κειμένου-πηγή, ωστόσο, είτε η μεταφράστρια/ο μεταφραστής, η επιμελήτρια/ο επιμελητής, ο εκδοτικός οίκος (στην περίπτωση βιβλίου) μπορεί να κρίνουν διαφορετικά κρίνοντας και αξιολογώντας με βάση το αναγνωστικό κοινό.

Η ακριβής, εφόσον είναι εφικτή, αντιστοίχιση όρων με τη γλώσσα στόχο είναι ευτυχής αλλά πάντα θυμόμαστε ότι απώλεια μηνύματος σημειώνεται από την στιγμή που εκείνο θα ξεκινήσει την πορεία του προς τον δέκτη. Πολύ περισσότερο δε, όταν πρέπει να περάσει μέσα από έναν διαφορετικό γλωσσικό κώδικα που φέρει τον δικό του πολιτισμό.

Επιπλέον, κάθε κείμενο συμπυκνώνει ένα παλίμψηστο όσων μπορούν να δηλωθούν σε μια γλώσσα και έτσι,

[...] μολονότι μπορούμε να περιγράψουμε το δύσκολο κείμενο και να εντοπίσουμε τις αιτίες της δυσκολίας του, δεν είναι εύκολο i) να ορίσουμε αντικειμενικά και εξαντλητικά τι αποτελεί (και τι δεν αποτελεί) μεταφραστική δυσκολία...ii) να επιτύχουμε γενική ομοφωνία ως προς αυτό το γλωσσολογικής τάξης φαινόμενο που καθορίζεται αποκλειστικά από τις συντακτικές, σημασιολογικές και/ή υφολογικές δυνατότητες της γλώσσας αφετηρίας, και iii) να καταγάγουμε εκ της πιθανής ομοφωνίας μεθοδολογικώς άτρεπτα συμπεράσματα σχετικά με την περιγραφή, την ιεράρχηση και την αξιολόγηση των δυσκολιών στη μετάφραση. (Κεντρωτής, 1996)

Μεταφράζοντας διαμεσολαβούμε, προσπαθούμε να ανασυστήσουμε για τον “άλλο” αναγνώστη την πραγματικότητα ενός τρίτου την οποία θα πρέπει να έχουμε “οικειοποιηθεί”. (Σελλά & Μπατσαλιά, 1997)

Επιδιώκεται, ή γίνεται προσπάθεια, να συνδυαστεί η επικοινωνιακότητα (Communicative translation) και η σημασιολογία (semantic translation). Στη μεν πρώτη περίπτωση, το κείμενο που θα παραδοθεί είναι όσο εγγύτερα γίνεται στο πρωτότυπο ως προς το μήνυμα και χαρακτηρίζεται από ελευθερία και στοχεύει στην άνετη πρόσληψη από τον αποδέκτη. Η δεύτερη προσπάθει να βρει κοινά σημεία στη δομή με το κείμενο-στόχος, στηρίζεται στους κανόνες, στην λεπτομέρεια. (Newmark, 1981).

Πέρα από τις κατηγοριοποιήσεις των κειμένων, την κοπιαστική αλλά πάντα ενδιαφέρουσα αναζήτηση και κριτική επεξεργασία πληροφοριών για την καλύτερη απόδοση του κειμένου συνολικά, η μεταφραστική διαδικασία έχει δύο χαρακτηριστικά : τη σταθερή ματαίωση για την απώλεια μηνύματος, ύφους, περικειμενικών στοιχείων και, ταυτόχρονα, την χαρά της δημιουργίας και του γεφυρώματος κόσμων, απόψεων, ζώων.

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Παράρτημα 1 – Σημειώσεις

- 1.1 1. *In order to avoid frictions between National Defence and supporters of the official Royal Government, the Allies carved in November of 1916 a neutral 5-10-km-long zone between the areas controlled by the two Greek Governments. Finally, in May of 1917 with the possibility of dethroning King Constantine, the French occupied the neutral zone, as well as the biggest part of Thessaly and south Epirus as far as Ioannina and Parga. See History of the Greek Nation (1987), 44*
- 1.2 2. Roussos (1976), Volume E1, 333-34; *History of the Greek Nation* (1978), 34-38; Paizis-Paradelis, (1999); Kavvadias (1950); Mezeviris (1971); Tsaprazis (2012), 96-97; Gerontas (2012), 582.
- 1.3 3. *This matter (e.n. the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire's Navy with the acquisition of the ready to sail "Rio de Janeiro" and "Resadie" brought great anguish to Navy circles, and in order to deal with the situation, the Greek government proceeded with the purchase of two relatively old American battleships, "Kilkis" and "Lemnos", which were the only ones available for sale. This*

new acquisition, however, would not solve the problem, in case Turkey took possession of those two battleships, before “Salamis” arrived at Greece – See Mezeviris (1971), 30-31.

1.4 4. Roussos (1976), Volume E', 333-34; Tsaprazis (2012), 96-97.

1.5 5. Kavvadias (1950), 24.

1.6 6. *History of the Greek Nation* (1978), 34-38.

1.7 7. *History of the Greek Nation* (1978); Roussos (1976), Volume E', 333-34; Markezinis (1966); Tsaprazis, (2012).

1.8 8. *Venizelos' desire was for Greece to participate in the Dardanelles Operation organized by the Allies. This led to a disagreement with the King; the latter one knew about the study conducted by the Hellenic Army General Staff in relation to the Dardanelles Operations and the study resulted in defeat of the Allies. That is indeed what happened.*

1.9 9. *Venizelos violated the Article 99 of the Greek Constitution of 1911. According to this article, a foreign Army is neither accepted to serve in the Greek Armed Forces nor is it allowed to stay within the state or pass through it illegally.*

1.10 10. *Entente (Entente cordiale): This term is used to describe the various treaties signed between France and Great Britain that have marked the improvement of their relations since 1904. It is the fulfillment of the French Foreign Minister's policy, Theophile Delcasse, dating back to 1898. Delcasse believed that France would be safe against Germany only by establishing good relations with Great Britain. In 1907 followed the Anglo-Russian Entente and with it a triple defence system was consolidated: the Triple Entente. It must be noted, that Entente was the result of Bismarck's failed Foreign Policy, which demanded the isolation of France and Germany's good relations with Russia and Austria.*

11. *On the 29th of August, a military coup took place in Thessaloniki. However, it was not as successful as it was expected to be, because most of the 11th Division soldiers in Thessaloniki were against it. Had Sarail remained neutral, the coup would have been crushed. In the beginning, many proponents of Venizelos disapproved of the riots. Even Venizelos denounced these actions by the Government of National Defence, because the riots were premature and irresponsible. (See also, History of the Greek Nation (1978).*

12. *The fighting men were organized and armed royalist citizens. Many of them were retired military officers and soldiers, as a result of French and British demands for the Greek Army to disband. (See also, Mavrokordatos (1996).*

13. *The crown prince mentioned here is George II, born in 1890.*

14. *The leaders of the movement (e.n. Provisional Government of National Defence in Thessaloniki) deceptively hoped that they would be leading the rioting ship cadre and crew beside the French fleet. The only exception were the two torpedo-boats and the spare battleship Hydra, which had no combative value; Mezeviris (1971), 46. The taking over of Hydra was initiated by captain Georgios Kakoulidis, who stated the following about the plan: The French insisted on us causing rally among the two small torpedo-boats. They also crushed the riot attempt on the battleship, as they considered it a desperate remedy. I insisted under the condition that we would be at least seven officers in total as well as governor Vatsanos (...). Because of our persistence, the French finally had to bring more rebel officers by sending steamships. Thus, our contingent consisted of captain I. Vatsanos,*

lieutenants Levidis and Valasakis, medical officer A. Lampadaridis, another non-commissioned officer (NCO), a volunteer citizen and me; See Nikolaidis (2001), 69.

15. Discord was prevalent in the crew. A notable example of this was the case of the cruiser *Limnos*. The battleship squadron leader, rear admiral Ioannis Vatsanos, boarded *Limnos*. He had the support of other officers, NCOs and professional shooters who had participated in the National Defence Movement and since created an elite group. No captain was among them, so that position was given to the first-mate commander, I. Theophanidis. The Secretary of the Navy (SoN), Pavlos Kountouriotis, had to conduct inspections, so that order was kept on the ship. He called an assembly, penalized those who had taken leave or sent away to naval service, transferred the admiral and the captain and, finally, ordered the first mate to organize the crew on the ship - See Lamprinopoulos G., Captain V. N., notes from his archive in the book "History of the Hellenic Navy" (Haratsis) (1997), 73.

16. This discussion involves all the ships, except from the small destroyer (torpedo-boat) *Doxa*, which was sunk with everyone on board on the 17th of June 1917, close to Milos island, by the German submarine *UB-47*. After the *peace* making, the Austrian destroyer *Ulam* was given to Greece and was renamed *Smyrni* - See Paizis-Paradelis (1999).

17. The midshipman A. Zagkas, who had served on the destroyer called *Panther*, wrote the following in his journal: October 7, 1917. Friday. By order of the Ministry for Naval Affairs, I present myself on *Kilkis* (Keratsini, Athens) and then to the governor of *Panther*, I. Giannikostas, who gives me a leave for two days (...). October 10. Monday. I arrive at the Ship Yard, where I see *Panther* docked at the submersibles platform. The ship is in a terrible condition due to dirt and inadequate maintenance. - See Zagkas, A., captain V. N., handwritten journal 1917-1919 in the book "History of the Hellenic Navy" (Haratsis) (1997), 73. The ships that had been returned were generally in a bad condition too, as far as cleaning and maintenance are concerned. That fact certainly surprised and made a negative impression to the Greek seamen, as they demanded an impeccable appearance of the ships to an excessive extent even during wartime. When it comes to submarines in particular, their hydraulic accumulators were destroyed, since they had not been charged for a lengthy period. That is what initially caused their premature corrosion. - See Mezeviris (1971), 56-57.

18. However, the Greek Navy was deeply wounded by the national crisis and Schism. In the book of Mezeviris [(1971), 57] the following is written: There was a great lack of junior officers and, therefore, the headquarters consisted of myself, a merchant shipping reserve officer and an ensign, who was an excellent graduate of the Merchant Marine Academy. Half the crew consisted of men who had participated in the movement. Those men had no discipline whatsoever and believed that participating in the revolution would free them of their duty to the State. Those men contributed in a great extent to the country.

19. Ottomans, however, were envious of this situation, as they were planning to sink the Greek battleships *Averof* and *Kilkis* located in Istanbul. Abedin, Bey (1928), Maritime Inspection 74.

20. Naval History Museum Archive; Haratsis St. (1997); Nicolaidis D. (2001). The contribution of the Greek Army in Southern Russia' Karakassonis, P. (1934); Konstas, P. (1928); Hough, R. (1960); Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. (1987); Kennan, George F. (1984), Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920 (Vol.1, Russia Leaves the War-Vol. 2 The Decision to Intervene), W.W. Norton & Company, New York. Lincoln, Bruce (1991); Carr, Edward Hallett (1983); Pipes, Richard (1980).

21. In January 1905 a huge public demonstration took place in Saint Petersburg, which ended with the use of weapons by the guards. That day was named Bloody Sunday. In June of the same year the crew of the battleship Potemkin rebelled against its officers.

22. In May 1905, the Russian Fleet was terribly defeated by the Japanese Fleet in Tsushima Island. This outcome forced Russia to waive any of its claims on North Korea and lose both Port Arthur and South Manchuria Railway. Japan has now become an Allied Force.

23. Old Gregorian calendar.

24. -

25. -

26. *White Army* is called the group of Russian military divisions that were against Bolsheviks. The opposite term is *Red Army*.

27. Admiral Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak (1874-1920). He was initially the Kommandor of the Imperial Russian Navy. He participated in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), but when the Japanese occupied Port Arthur they apprehended him along with other Russian officers. During the post-war period, he participated actively in the expeditions to the Arctic Ocean, even in those in 1904 and 1912. In world WWI he was captain of the Baltic Fleet torpedo-boat, but due to his acknowledged administrative ability, he became commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Unfortunately, his crew rebelled in Sevastopol (1917) and displaced him in Siberia along with his headquarters. At British instigation, he became leader of the Anti-Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks arrested him in the city of Irkutsk and executed him. *Encyclopaedic Dictionary Helios, Alexander Vasilievich Kolchak*.

28. Kerman (1984).

29. Lincoln (1983).

30. Pipes (1980).

31. On October 20 of 1918, Venizelos sent a letter to Lloyd George. The letter had an attached note, with which Venizelos was directly asking from him the annexation of Western Thrace and a sui generis regime for Istanbul and Eastern Thrace. Markezinis (1966).

32. Georges Clemenceau asked directly the participation of Greece in the intervention in Russia.

33. -

34. The particular date on which the last patrol ended has not been found.

35. Haratsis (1997).

36. Haratsis (1997).

37. In the armistice signed with Germany, the Allies imposed the condition that the first ones would deliver their battleships. Those included the Russian battleships taken over by Germans. However, the commander of the German Navy in the Black Sea...???

38. In March and April 1919, the French soldiers and mariners committed mutiny in Odessa and other ports of the Black Sea, such as Sevastopol. The 40th Infantry Regiment denied marching to the front. The shooters of the 30th Division rebelled as well...???

39. -

40. Giannikostas' reports to the commander of Georgios Averof: *After discussions with the French and British commanders, I came to the conclusion that there is nothing clear or specific about this campaign.*

41. On the 25th of April/ 8th of May 1919, *Iearx*, was hit by a 6-node voltage and, while its carburetor was being filled, it drifted into the Black Sea and broke the *frames* on its own bow.

42. Haratsis (1997).

43. Officer Zagkas reports: *The Greeks welcomed us from the wire fences (...).A glorious welcome. It was impossible to walk on the deck. The visits continued until late in the night.*

44. A ship type in the size of a corvette or frigate.

45. Fakidis (1996), Roussos (1989), Tsapraxis (1991), Melissinos (1928).

46. Edict II (30/05/1914), *On the astounding regulations of 1914 on enlistment, number and entrance exams of the Midshipmen. Official Government Gazette, Issue A, P. 147, June 5, 1914.*

47. Edict II (19/08/1914) *On the summer uniform of the Midshipmen. Government Gazette, Issue A, P. 234, August 21, 1914.*

48. Edict II (20/06/1915) *On the Training of the Midshipmen. Official Government Gazette, Issue A, P. 229, June 22, 1915.*

49. Edict II (25/05/1918), *On the operation of the Midshipmen Academy.*

50. Law 2043, 25/02/1920, *On the various regulations concerning the absolutely-eliminated from the Midshipmen Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A, P. 51, February 29, 1920.*

51. Edict II (19/11/1922), *On the operation of the Midshipmen Academy.*

52. See Melissinos (1928). *Kilkis* was one of the battleships that hosted ensigns. In the summer of 1920 those ensigns were J. Lamprou, D. Voropoulos, D Zeppos, P, Nikolettis, Georgas, M. Kinatos, N, Vourekas, P. Damiralis, P., Sahtouris, E. Papadiamantopoulos, A. Economopoulos, G. Mplessas, D, Hatzopoulos, L. Kallergis, S. Zotos, G. Mpakas, J. Melissinos and K. Damilatis.

53. The British naval forces consisted of rear admiral *Lionel G. Tuffnell*, captain *Edward J. H. Boyle R.N.*, chief of Staff, chief purser *Georg. B. Townsend R.N.*, chief engineer *Joseph H. Pill R.N.*, lieutenant commander *Kenneth Gofton Salmond R.N.*, master shipbuilder *A. H. Gould* and chief of operations secretary, *K. Cambell*. Rouskas (1989), 112.

54. Edict II (20/02/1914), *On the supplementing act of the Law (3489) of December 17, 1909. On the establishment of the teacher's profession*. Official Government Gazette, Issue A. P. 46, February 22, 1914.

55. -

56. Official Government Gazette, Issue A. P. 400, Law No 535 of December 30th 1914, *On Recruitment, Unit E, About voluntary recruitment in the Royal Navy*.

57. Official Government Gazette, Issue A. P. 101, May 9, 1918. Royal Decree, *On lower secondary education in the Navy*.

58. *Midshipmen Academy*, Articles 66-84.

59. *Specialized Schools, operating in Main -Gymnasium*. Articles 13-65.

60. Tsaparazis (1991). Hellenic General Naval Staff (HNGS) B' (1919). Kavvadias (1950). Mezeviris (1971). Siokos (1926).

61. The admiral Mezeviris reports: *The way things turned out- even the demand to hand over the battleships- was expected. Therefore, we exhausted our inventive minds, so as to make it difficult for them to use the ships. We hid parts of the cannons and engines ashore, we deliberately made wrong wiring in the complicated electrical installations and sent the blueprints to Athens. The steam pipes had been so damaged that whoever tried to steam power the ship would be unpleasantly surprised.*

62. Although Tsaparazis refers to it as "French destroyer", admiral Mezeviris [(1971), 49] is clear: *On the other side, on the 14th of October 1916, the admiral Kountouriotis sent a letter from Thessaloniki addressing to all officers that had not taken part in the movement. He sent the letter through captain G. Kakoulidis, who was on the cargo ship "Marievan" in Keratsini. The ship was under the supervision of the French admiral and was used for gathering those leaving their ships to join the movement.*

63. *Finally, the embarrassing news spread by word of mouth like lightning: "They've come to take our ships". The crew members were in a state of strong upheaval. Around 9:30 am, cruiser Kanaris that was carrying the light-duty fleet commander, admiral Epitis, was moored on the dock tread of the Naval Base. The ship raised the white flag as a sign of the Greek flag submitting and all the ships followed, except for the battleships Averof, Kilkis and Lemnos. At the same time, "Abandon ship" was signaled. All crew members got on lifeboats with tears in their eyes and headed to Skaramagkas and from there to Athens, where they camped at the Field of Mars. There was a special order relating to the battleships: everybody had to leave except for 100 crew members need for the ship's maintenance. All the ships were towed to Keratsini and moored close to the flagship. The destroyers type Aigli were handed over to the French and the submarines to the British. The process of handing over our ships was really humiliating. Armed naval contingents on the tugboats were flanking our ships with guns in their hands and they were making regular inspections, to make sure that all ships were evacuated. See also Tsaparazis (1991), pp: 117-18. Mezeviris (p. 49) reports the following: *The crew members that had disembarked the ships formed a naval contingent, which was used for maintaining order in Athens. It was no surprise, that after being forced to abandon their ships, they were fanatically hostile against the Allies and the Greeks that cooperated with them. That fanaticism was actively manifested during the next month, namely November. However, no other explanation was given concerning the reasons behind that hostility against the Allies during that distressing**

period, as well as the hostility against those of us, who even since our childhood were used to love them. All I have to do is present the opinions on those incidents, as they are mentioned on admiral Epitis' memoirs: The occupation of the Greek fleet was presented as an achievement and many observers believed they should congratulate the Chief. Nevertheless, I can now say that I was actually suffering. That situation forced me to use violence against a neutral and weak state, which was under French tutelage, and against the Navy and many friends of mine. I had to do so, but there was no reason for me to be happy or brag about it.

64. Tsaparazis (1991), 118.

65. Pp. 118-19.

66. There is a strange article in the *Naval Review* (Jan – Feb 1919, Hellenic Navy General Staff B' *Greek Navy*), which analyzes the contribution of the Greek Navy (both military and commercial) providing statistics. I believe that those statistical numbers must be correct, because the article was published soon after the hostilities had taken place. The assumption that those numbers originate from some kind of archives in a General Navy Staff office is pretty valid. As far as Salamis Naval Base is concerned, the article states the following:

a) *At the Naval Base, 135 Greek and 84 Allied steamships entered the tank for cleaning and repairing. In the Naval Base workshops got repaired the following vessels: 90 Greek and 128 Allied battleships, 16 Greek and 20 Allied cargo ships. 1234 engineers worked to repair the ships. Naval Base crew: 2203*

b) *Requisitioned: Shipyards, 3 machine shops and 3 factories that engaged 2200 staff for the repairing of 222 battleships, naval auxiliaries and commanding steamships. Total value of the repair services 8.500.000 (no specific currency is mentioned, therefore, it is assumed it refers to Greek drachma).*

67. Siokos (1926). Due to missing records, this particular article is a source of important information.

68. *Official Government Gazette*, Issue A. P. 162, July 23, 1919, New Edict 19-07-1919, *On the creation of a Naval Base in Istanbul*.

69. *The period of intensive work to equip, inspect and test the ships started in the middle of April and lasted until the beginning of June, which was approximately 45 days. During that period ten ships were prepared, seven of which possessed 4-5 guns and 4 machine-guns. One should take into account that every equipping operation of those ships was done from scratch, as no preparatory work was taking place.*

70. *It is now proper to talk about Turkish Army, even though Turkey had not been consolidated as a state yet.*

71. Tsaparazis, N. (1991), pp 126-128 and SKRIP Greek newspaper, December 23, 1921.

72. Paloumbis, I. (2012), *Circumnavigation of Naval History* 77.

1.11 73. Tsaprazis (1991).

74. Tsaprazis (1991), 133. EPMO: Ecclesiastical Property Management Organization.

75. Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 283, 25 June 1935, On the demarcation of the Old Naval Base area.
76. Fakidis (1996); Rouskas (1989); Tsaprazis (1991); Paizis-Paradelis (1999); Konstantinidis (1936), 148; Zervas (1923), 38; Papadimitriou (1929), 88.
77. On the Organization of the Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 262, 22 October 1924 · On the training and Comportment of the Naval Cadets, Official Government Gazette, M.D. 266, October 25, 1924.
78. Fakidis (1996), 96.
79. *ibid.*, 96.
80. Ranking in engineering at that time: Non-commissioned officers: Second-class Petty Officer, First-class Petty Officer, Chief Petty Officer, Master Chief Petty Officer. Officers: Second-Class Engineer, First-Class Engineer, Engineer, Second-Class Chief Engineer, First-Class Chief Engineer, Senior Chief Engineer. The Second-Class Petty Officers were selected by competition from 1) Two-class engineers, 2) graduates of Greek or foreign polytechnic universities, 3) former managers or deputy managers of ship engines and 4) those who served for two years as plant managers of engineering works or for one year as engineers drivers of steam locomotives. They were promoted to Second-Class Petty Officers through competition due to seniority or through election up to Master Chief Petty Officers, in Second-Class Engineers through exams, and Senior Engineers due to seniority or through an election and up to Chief Engineers through an election. See: Fakidis (1996), 99. 80 Νόμος 3333, On grading, enlisting, training and qualification promoting of Officers and non-commissioned Engineer Officers of Hellenic Navy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D.143, 9 June 1925 · On Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 229, August 31, 1925.
81. Νόμος 3333, On grading, enlisting, training and qualification promoting of Officers and non-commissioned Engineer Officers of Hellenic Navy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D.143, 9 June 1925 · On Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 229, August 31, 1925.
82. It was Byron Krystallidis. As a lieutenant, governor of the tender *Pleias*, he died of his injuries on April 21, 1941, during the air raid against the ship. Navy ships were named after him.
83. On the Organization of the non-Commissioned Officers Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 145, June 28, 1924.
84. On training engineer, health and logistics Officers and on transferring engineer cadets to the fields of Naval Architecture, Electrical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering of Naval Aviation of Hellenic Navy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 57, February 24, 1930.
85. *Aris* in 1940-41 was used as a ship hospital. During the collapse of the National Front and the migration of the Fleet, it was decided that the ship could not follow, firstly because sailors and hoplites were hospitalized in it and secondly because its speed was low. It was taken intact by the Germans, who changed its name to *Graz*. On 5/12/1942, near the port of Bizerta, Tunisia, it fell into a mine and sank with many casualties among the Greeks and

Germans of his crew. Of the Greeks, 50 were killed and only 11 were saved. See Paizis-Paradelis (1999)

86. Papadimitriou (1929), 88.

87. Ibid., 104.

88. On the Organization of the Academy for the non-commissioned Officers, Official Government Gazette, M.D. 145, June 28, 1924.

89. On the Organization of the Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, M.D. 325, October 27, 1925

90. Ruskas (1989), 119.

91. Rouskas (1989), 121.

92. On the organization of the Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, Issue A', M.D. 190, September 18, 1928.

93. *History of the Greek Nation*, (1978)· Roussos (1976), vol. 6. Metaxas. Diaries, Markezinis (1966); Kavvadias (1950); Mezeviris (1971); Haratsis (1985).

94. Roussos (1976), vol. 6, 456

95. The leader of the Liberals himself during the discussion of the relevant bill on December 18, 1928, said: One of the happiest days of my life will be when complying with the first decision of the Council of the Republic, I will cancel my relevant administrative measure.

96. The Senate was the second legislature, which would have 120 members, of which 18 would be elected by professional unions, 10 would be aristocrats and would be elected in a joint sitting by deputies and senators and 92 would be elected by the nine-year term by the people through elections.

97. *History of the Greek Nation* (1978)· Roussos (1976), vol. 6 · Metaxas, Diary, vol. 3, Markezinis (1966); Kavvadias (1950); Mezeviris (1971); Haratsis (1985).

98. The day after the election victory in Thessaloniki (by-elections held in Thessaloniki on July 2, 1933 after the annulment of the result of March 5 in this city) Eleftherios Venizelos left for his annual spa treatment in France (Bagnols). Before leaving, however, he had assigned the organization of a military movement to a three-member committee, which consisted of Colonel Sarafis for the Army, Captain Kolialaxis for the Navy and the politician Al. Zannas –who soon left - as the organization's liaison with Venizelos. See Roussos, G. (1976), vol. 6, 499.

99. Characteristic are the words of Chr. Tsigande: At the end of January 1935 we had reached an open rift with the Plastiriks. The reason was that they wanted to make a Plastirik movement, to bring Plastiras as ruler and dictator [...]. Plastiras wanted his own dictatorship. Venizelos did not want a dictatorship, but he did not want his opponents to rule. Ethnos newspaper, Haratsis S., p. 174 and "However, an organization of junior officers headed by Captain I. Tsigantes had been set up at the same time (with the three-member committee and the Plasterists), which quickly spread to the higher ones, called GMO (Greek Military Organization-ESO). GMO had radical but confusing directions, it wanted to impose a "new 1909" and for no reason did it accept N. Plastiras as its leader (...). Roussos (1976), 506.

100. See Roussos (1976), 509.

101. His ship had been attacked by *Breguet-19* type aircraft. During an air raid, Commander A. Stasinopoulos was slightly injured in the neck, Lieutenant Commander N. Tsagaris in the face. A sailor was also injured while another sailor, seriously injured, was taken to the Naval Hospital of Chania, where he died. See Haratsis (1985), 199.

102. Dismissed on 22/06/1935 due to participation in the 1935 movement. In 1936 the discount from his rank was canceled, he was considered in retirement from 11/6/1935 as a Lieutenant. In 1940 he was recalled to the rank of Lieutenant. During World War II he served in the Naval Defense Area 1 (NDA-1-Patras) and as captain of the T2 torpedo boat, which sank during the German invasion. After World War II, as a Commander, he was the captain of the submarine *Papanikolis*. See Dimitrakopoulos (2006).

103. Kavvadias (1950) · Mezeviris (1971) · Sakellariou (1945) · Paizis-Paradelis (1999) · Management of Aviation History (1990) · Fakidis (1996); History of Hellenic Nation (1978) · Roussos (1976) vol. F. Markezinis (1966).

104. During this period the foundations of a naval construction program were laid, which took its final form by a law of 1931. The composition of the Navy was the subject of long discussions because a large number of officers had declared themselves in favor of heavy vessels, while the Prime Minister supported a composition with only light vessels. This last view eventually prevailed because it was supported by subsequent governments. See Mezeviris (1971), 1031.

105. It has already been mentioned in the previous chapter of the book.

106. (..) third expertise (The Greek side claimed that the ship was outdated by the war) has been made by a Norwegian Admiral who said that the ship is very strong, worthy to be opposed to every post-war dreadnought and that Greece is obliged to take it. Mr. Venizelos convened the ANΣ and raised the issue with them. The ship has to be rejected because he does not want any dreadnoughts but only a lightweight Fleet so that we do not impinge on Turkey which is our friend currently... even if we have to pay. See abstract from Kavvadias (1950), 37. In addition, in three articles in the Athenian newspaper "Ethnikos Kyrix" (The National Herald) of pages 6, 7 and 8 February 1948, Vice Admiral D. Economou argues that the ship was rejected due to the satisfaction of Italy and that Turkey was used as a pretext.

107. The beginning is made by the naval program. In order to finally start regular shipbuilding, a law will be passed, determining what and how many ships we will build within a decade and the relevant credits will escalate. When it was finally voted in 1929 for two consecutive financial years, due to lack of money the credit indicated in the budget is allocated to other expenses and of course at the same time is taken from the Public Fund and the allocated amount of the National Fleet, which will not be refunded. According to the law, until 1938 we had to own 1 new Eidromon, 12 new destroyers and 8 submarines and in 1940 we will own 6 new destroyers and 6 rather old submarines. It is natural to refer to the time of the common force of the Fleet and to the provisional solutions of the moment · at least then, we were buying ships. See Kavvadias (1950), 33. According to this (the Naval Program), within the first six years, apart from the four Hydra-type destroyers, another four of 1,400 tons must be constructed, one Flagship of 2,000 tons and one submarine minelayer. At the same time, there would be a gradual organization of coastal defense and the completion of, of all kinds, the needs of the Navy, in military equipment and facilities. It had, however, already passed three years, without any step being taken, for the implementation of the provisions of the Program. Especially for the ordering of new destroyers, the usual, on our part, versatility contributed to the fact that none of them will be delivered within six years. See Mezeviris (197), 128

108. The failure of these ships as soon as they arrived in Greece was so obvious that it caused a great deal of indignation in the Navy, which, due to political beliefs, reached the point of scandal. These ships and their practical performance during the war, will be my nightmare. M.E. (s.s. Middle East, refers to the emigration of the Fleet during World War II in Alexandria and the continuation of the struggle against the Axis while Greece had collapsed. It will be mentioned in the next chapter) will be purely negative with all the effort and capacity of the staff. See Kavvadias (1950), 40 and the placement of the order in Italian shipyards, regardless of any general reasons of the foreign policy of the then Government, was justified by their relatively low price and their considerable speed. In practice, however, it turned out that these ships were lagging behind in maritime properties and their low price was at the expense of the rigidity of construction. As for the speeds of 40 and 41 miles, we never had them, perhaps because in the first years after the receipt of the ships, when the performance of such speeds is especially expected, there was no sufficiently specialized engine. See Mezeviris (1971), 103.

109. When the present law is put into effect and until the regulatory Ordinances of the Air Ministry, all the aeronautical services of the Ministries of Military, Navy and Transportation with all the personnel, up to and including each detachment, the materials and all kinds of facilities that come under the jurisdiction of the Air Ministry, maintaining the acquisitions of its personnel respectively in the Army and the Navy or the Public Service, of the Air Minister who exercises in accordance with the law the rights of the Ministers of the Army, the Navy and Transportation. Article 3, Law 4451.

110. It was an important project for the organization of the National Meteorological Service. After World War II, he served as its director (1945-1947, Wing Commander) taking part in many conferences abroad. He is considered, in essence, the creator of the National Meteorological Service. See Dimitrakopoulos (2006).

111. On the Organization of Hellenic Naval Academy, Official Government Gazette, issue A', A.F. 369, October 8, 1929.

112. Fakidis (1996), 113.

113. Op. cit., p. 113.

114. On the classification of Electrical-construction, Naval architecture and Logistics Midshipmen of the Hellenic Navy at vacant statutory posts, Official Government Gazette, 491/A/ 26-10/ 1935.

115. On the competition for the classification of Logistics Midshipmen Cadets, Official Government Gazette 583/A/20-11/1935.

116. On Midshipmen Cadets of the Royal Hellenic Navy, Official Government Gazette, 128/A/12-3/ 1936. On the training of Port Authority Cadets, Official Government Gazette 166/A/16-4/1936. On the School of Naval Architects and Electrical-Engineering Midshipmen, Official Government Gazette 195/A/9-5/1936.

117. Fakidis (1996), 117

118. Op. cit., p. 117

119. On the amendment of the Decree of 28 June 1928, on the Organization of NCOs Cadets School, Official Government Gazette 64/A/21-2/1929.

120. On the Organization of Naval Trainees, Official Government Gazette, 105/A/22-2/1936.

121. Rouskas (1989), 124.

122. The attempted coup d'état of 1935 led by N. Plastiras, created a gap between Venizelists and Anti-Venizelists. The two major parties could not cooperate and therefore the appointment of Metaxas as Prime Minister by King George appeared to be the only possible solution. This is indicated by the fact that the Liberal Party gave its vote of confidence to Metaxas while the People's Party gave a vote of tolerance.

123. During this meeting of the Supreme Naval Council, Ioannis Metaxas emphasized on the following: *"That what I intend to tell you is not to be communicated to anyone. I foresee a war between England and Germany. A war much worse than the previous one. I will do everything I can to avoid the involvement of Greece in it; but this will not be possible. Needless to say, in this warfare we will be on the side of England. I repeat once again: the latter must not be disclosed"* Fokas (1953), vol. A, p. 10. During the summer of 1940, in the most critical phase of the war, after the disaster of Dunkirk, when England was in imminent danger, I. Metaxas stated to Admiral Sakellariou: *"I totally agree with you and I underline, so that you can encourage all those around you, that our position is to remain steadily on the side of England; despite their renowned defects, despite their nuisances concerning our financial issues, only in alliance with England could ever, a small states like us, achieve prosperity; even if sometimes they throw us out. No nation could survive with Germans, as allies or enemies; if we fall into their hands, we will be completely deprived, kicked and they will not even let us take a single breath. Consequently, not only we will stand strongly by England, but we must do our utmost to make them realize that we will stand by their side until the end, whatever the outcome of the war is."* Q. v. op. cit., p.10 and Sakellariou (1945), p. 24.

124. Admiral Sakellariou reports: *"Many argued that we generated great expenditures for fortifications, shipyards, training schools- and not for battleships. This is a more general issue though, related, before anything else, to the general allocation of funds from the regular and emergency budgets of the State to the military ministries; and this allocation results from the general policy, implemented by the State. And, it is known that the Prime Minister allocates these on the basis of a clear and solid objective of the current foreign policy, namely against which enemy has the country to be militarily prepared, either alone or with certain –and which- of the Allies."* Q. v. Sakellariou (1945), p. 53-54.

125. Gerontas (2013).

126. The aim of the departure to Middle East was not simply the escape from destruction, but mostly the continuation of the fight until the end. However, it was not only the ships that departed, but the entire Hellenic Navy with its Commander-in-Chief of the HNGS, Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Commanders, Captains, Officers, NCOs and crews; that is to say the entire Navy as a structured system. Beleaguered but not defeated, with no equivalent found to it, throughout History. And this is something that shall not be disregarded nor forgotten. Dimitrakopoulos (2013).

127. For younger people, still youngsters, things were easier. It must have been the enthusiasm and the adventurous spirit that played a significant role. However, for the older officers and NCOs the dilemmas must have been terrible. They were leaving their wives, their children, their superannuated parents, their homeland at the most inopportune moment,

the moment of its enslavement. Would they ever see them again? And yet they left. Entire crews of sunken ships ran out to get aboard on any ship. They left because this is what their patriotism, their duty and the shame of its non-execution, dictated so. Undoubtedly, there were cases of people who failed in courage –extremely few- that should be setting the example. This is the helplessness of human race (...). Op. cit.

128. Op. cit.

129. War Journals of HNGS 1939-1944. Officers' reports: Fokas (1953), Kavvadias (1950), Sakellariou (1945), Mezeviris (1971), Paizis-Paradelis (1999), Fakidis (1996), Rouskas (1989), Tsaprazis (1991), Lachanos (1991), *Naval Review*, issue 586.

130. On local defense, Official Government Gazette, Issue No 300, 13/9/1926.

131. On the State's coastline organization into Naval Defense Areas (NDA), Official Government Gazette, Issue No 635, 30/12/1935.

132. Admiral Sakellariou reports: *"Regarding our difficulty of obtaining foreign exchange, it should not be forgotten that our friends the British and the Americans demanded payment in pounds and dollars. The Axis States, on the contrary, had invented the system of compensation-clearing and we paid our supplies –those bought from them- with tobacco, raisins, minerals, and anything else our poor land produces."* Q. v. Sakellariou (1945), p. 58.

133. Admiral Kavvadias reports: *"The abovementioned equipment – from which the 90% was brand new and bought at a fixed price with the financial support of the Ministry of Naval Affairs- was distributed for the anti-aircraft Defense of the former Capital Region Command and also of the Isthmus of Corinth, Patras, Preveza, Thessaloniki, Volos, Chalkida and later of Corfu and Agioi Saranta (TN : Sarandë). Then, after listing the personnel allocated by the Navy for the organization and manning of all the necessary auxiliary formations (close-in protection unit, technical services, traction devices, construction team), the Admiral pointedly concludes: "This means that the Navy disposed more personnel for the common anti-aircraft defense than the total crews available on the warships of its Fleet". Q.v. Kavvadias (1950), p. 109.*

134. *"The units developed in the Athens-Salamis-Naval Station area were tactically subordinated to the Area Air Defense Command/A, Commander, General Stai, and formed the A2 unit, while those of the Chalkida, Patras and Volos areas were tactically subordinated to the respective Naval Defense Areas and their naval Chief commanders". War Journals of HNGS - Activity reports of Commander Christos Chatziconstantis. (Note: The Anti-aircraft Artillery was under Vice-Admiral Oikonomou, and during the war in Greece its Chief Officer was Commander Ch. Chatzokonstantis.)*

135. The Patras Naval Hospital, which according to the initial plan was supposed to be found within the city limits by means of a clinic requisition, was eventually founded in the suburbs of Patras, since the clinics designated for requisition were all destroyed after the first bombardments. The hospital was properly organized and was successfully operating within the first months.

136. It refers to Pericles Bouboulis who was actively involved in the Asia Minor Campaign, as a member of Naval Aviation.

137. The Greek destroyer *Vasilefs Georgios* was built at the Yarrow & Company's Shipyard in Scotland, in 1936-1938. After its arrival in Greece, it served as the flagship of the Destroyer *Flotilla*. It participated in the first (14-15/1/1940) and in the third (4-5/1/1941) raid in the Strait of Otranto. While anchored in Sofiko Bay, it was hit by German aircrafts and suffered severe damages. It managed with difficulty to reach Salamis Naval Base, where due to German advance and to failure to be repaired in time, its destruction was decided, which was never completed though, and the ship fell to the Germans, who then renamed it *Hermes*.

138. A special signal lamp used not only for lighting but also for optical communication through flashes of light.

139. The Battle of Cape Matapa was a naval engagement of extreme significance for the development of World War II, where the English Fleet decisively fought the Italians. Due to poor communication, the Greek Fleet was never able to participate in this battleship.

140. Here, referring to the Greek tugboat, under English authority, *Verenicos Irini*.

141. Fokas (1953), vol. A, p. 458-63.

142. The N. Commander of Thermaic Gulf reports 65 diesel-powered crafts.

143. Until then, the British had not accepted our multiple proposals to use our ships for their military missions as well, but we did not insist as it was known that our ships were not as capable as the British ones. However, the downfall of the British Fleet mentioned above made our ships a bit more worthy. That is why I informed the Military League that if needed it would be possible to postpone the voyage of the destroyer *Kountouriotis* to India, because the ship was fast and it would be very helpful for the operations near Alexandria (...). Certainly, I think they understood that in this common war we wanted to share not only the efforts, but also the sacrifices, which during that period were a lot harder for them. See Kavvadias (1950), 441.

144. Our older and also scorned ships had no action on the real battlefield as well. They were always unlucky and did not encounter the enemy (although the submarine *Niki* escorted by a British ship sank a German submarine, which was 10 miles west). Also, the foul weather worsened the already bad condition of these really old ships. On December 2, *Niki* was ordered to sail to Alexandria under escort. Neither the British authorities, nor Tombazis noticed the bad weather, because of his desire to sail. See Kavvadias (1950), 436.

145. Message of the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet Cunningham to the Greek Navy (December 19, 1941, at 11.29 am): The Greek naval units are not needed for the patrolling outside of the Bardia-Sollum area. Although they were not lucky enough to encounter any enemy ships, the patrols of your units probably prevented the enemy from continuing to supply the above ports. See Kavvadias (1950), 437.

146. Sakellariou (1945), *ibid*.

147. Fokas (1953), vol. B', p. 104.

148. I had to take emergency measures in order to maintain discipline. We even had to ask the Indian Government to pass special laws so that we can imprison there the mutineers of the ship *Averof*. After three trials in Mumbai, 25 seamen were tried and punished, and most of the officers who remained inactive were charged and convicted as well. Also, the

Commanding Officer of the ship was tried and convicted of violence against a person of lower rank. Then, after another trial in England, where the charged seamen were convicted, the order was finally restored not only on *Averof*, but on our ships in general. See Sakellariou (1945), vol. B', 230.

149. However, among the good news of receiving new ships, there were bad ones as well: the mobilisation of the seamen proceeded at a slow pace because of their reluctance to exchange the salary of the Merchant Navy with the lower salary of a Royal Hellenic Navy seaman (...). The sight of those people, who were influenced by theories incomprehensible to the most of them and who were hindering the Allied fight, was rather sad and alarming. In their eyes was visible not only the hate, but also the belief that with these actions they were showing their “anti-fascist” – that is how they called them so as not to mention the real name “communist” – views! (...). These events, which happened at the same time with the mutiny on *Averof* in Mumbai, showed that other than strict repressive measures, a better relationship between officers and crew was needed as well, in order to avoid any conspiracies and slanders of all kinds of subversive elements. The major reason for this direction was the most unusual conditions, under which our armed forces had waged this war for more than a year. The seamen were away from their homeland and unable to communicate with their family. The Greek Government, which despite all its efforts and the undeniable patriotism of the President and the members, did not come from the people’s vote, nor had any support for real exercise of power. See Alexandris (1952), 53.

150. Until mid-July, the Fleet Headquarters were in a hospital car! Then, they were transferred to the school of the Greek community of Ismailia.

151. See chapter for Naval Training

152. Our Allies could see that our ships were carrying out military missions while their boiler tubes were exploding during the voyage, and that the boilers were in a very bad condition in general. They could see that one destroyer was carrying out a military mission with its engine not being able to work in reverse· that a small forty-year-old torpedo boat never stopped its patrols even when facing any kind of damage (...). Our ships were gradually joining British flotillas as convoy escort groups. Even though we had different flags, we started to lead mixed convoys with both British and Greek escorting ships. And it was the first time in the forty years of my life in the Navy, that I saw such a big action of our ships across the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea, with such long voyages and such an exceptional naval and technical condition of the Commanding Officers, the staffs and crews. I am very satisfied with this action, and it fills me with national pride. See Sakellariou (1945), vol. B1, 236.

